Speaker 0
0:00 – 0:55
This is a RadicalxChange production. Hello, and welcome to Radical Exchanges. This is the third episode in our short series exploring the theme of what and how we own, building a politics of change. In In today's episode, Matt Pruitt talks to Indi Johar, architect and cofounder of Dark Matter Labs. Their discussion centers on the traditional roles of property and labor in capitalism and Marxism, and the possibilities of radical change through technology enhanced governance. Specifically, how might including non human agents in governance lead us to better care oriented economies? Radical X Change is working with Indi Johar and the rest of his team at Dark Matter Labs together with Margaret Levy's research team at Stanford on exploring and reimagining the institutions of ownership. Without further ado, let's dive in with Indy Johar and Matt Pruitt.
Speaker 1
0:57 – 1:03
Excellent. Indeed, you are. I am, really looking forward to this, this conversation.
Speaker 2
1:05 – 1:16
Likewise. I'm super delighted. And, there's so many conversations that we've had, I think are worth, putting out into a broader conversation. So I'm really delighted and honored to be to be here. So thank you, Matt. Yeah.
Speaker 1
1:17 – 1:31
I guess, I you know, I'd love to just sort of start with some with some basics. Why why do you care about the question of ownership? Why do you see it as so, so fundamental?
Speaker 2
1:32 – 7:08
Well, I think it's a good question to start with. I mean, I think the question of ownership, and this is sort of slightly kind of, not radical, but slightly kind of positional, is I would argue that whether you look at capitalism or whether you look at Marxism or whatever, all those things are predicated on theories of property, labor, contract. And the only difference is who chooses. Right? So where the choice lies of property, where the choice lies of Mhmm. Of, of labor. And I think one of the interesting questions for me is they are both dominated by a theory of dominion of the world. Mhmm. They're both dominated by a theory of dominion. Now I think what's happened is over a course of time, that theory of dominion, which was at first an embodied dominion, I. E. Your relationship with the things that you owned, let's use that landscape, was an embodied theory of ownership. As people like, Catherine Pestor elegantly put out, we've been coding capital and abstracting capital to the point that we've disembodied theories of ownership, theories of labor, theories of employment so significantly away from the embodied entanglements of things that they have in the process become problematic domains. And those problematic domains have and they in the app in the act of abstraction and the act of delinking them, they are creating vast systemic externalities. And at the point of that abstraction, I think we've also created a problem space, which is that our theory of governance, which is a means to regulate that abstraction, as we slowly disembodied it, I would argue, as a kind of sort of a sort of an open narrated arc, that regulatory landscape has also had to become massively centralized. Now the capacity to regulate complex situational realities through centralized means of regulation kind of worked as an as an illusion in a relatively linear predictable world. As the feedback systems became not only apparent but material because the accumulative effects of c o two, accumulative effects of ecological destruction became so significant where the feedbacks are no longer material. And our side of the feedback is people like Daniel would say feedback into the point of self termination. Those micro violence is now accumulated to be so significant that they're self terminating. So those two dimensions are both abstraction, disembodiment of of relationships of, entangled being that happen through ownership and the abstraction of our coding of capital and our failure to be able to regulate in a complex world have come together to, I think, undermine our current theory of how we relate to the world. Ownership is just a means. It's a it's a device. And I think that's what systemically challenging, but not just challenging ownership of things, ownership of land and things, but it's also challenging, I think, there is a property. I think it's challenge challenging theories of organizing. It's challenging what I would argue are the kind of systemic roots that are means of organizing capital, whether whether capitalism or or Marx doesn't really matter, that they're not able to do. And I think and they're both functions of what I would call information and possibilities. So they become information impossible to regulate and control. And I think we're reaching a moment where that requires us to transcend our theories of property, transcend our theories of labor, transcends our theory of contracting, can transcend our theories of organizing as we've done, command and control organizing. And to put it into a bigger picture or a sort of macro picture, I would argue this is also part of a theory of control and dominion, control and punishment economies. So we've been built our economy is being built with theories of you know, I think, Matt, I think you said this once and I think it was even in Bellagio where the kind of they are largely residual structures of the theory of kingship and that they control models and punishment models of our economy. And control of punishment models were theoretically okay in a linear predictable world, but in a complex entangled situational world, they don't work. And and I think what we're seeing is that kind of end of control is a dominant means of organizing, not just morally. I think morally, it's problematic fundamentally for since route one. But perhaps even in terms of efficacy, it's no longer viable. And I think those two things are coming together to be able to challenge that. And I think the final point I'll add is I think when you add what I would say is a revolution in bureaucracy, which is our shift in bureaucratic capabilities from analog centralized systems to new forms of computational bureaucracy, I think that creates a new capacity of bureaucracy to be able to handle a new relational and agentified world. So I think the kind of construct this is a function of these systemic failures, systemic, new capabilities that are coming to the table, and a new theory of organizing warranted by a sort of an increasingly real real and tangled world. And that's why I think that the theory of property is under challenge and and requires renewal.
Speaker 1
7:09 – 7:54
But one thing that I hear in this, which is interesting, and I'm I'm curious what your what your reaction would be is is that it almost sounds like you're saying and this could be completely wrong. This is a gloss, which, you know, please sort of tear it down if it doesn't make sense. But I I it almost sounds like there's it almost sounds like a sort of a mirror image of, like, the of a sort of Hayakian critique of a central planning economy. It's, like, almost as though we've gotten to the, you know, the opposite of that problem in which it's impossible not to centrally plan the economy, but to centrally regulate the economy. Does that, does that track? Yeah. I mean,
Speaker 2
7:54 – 8:59
yeah, I would argue in our critiques of market, if you look at the centralized production of capital, what is it sort of I certainly know the stats in The UK. I think it's 97% of capital production is done by four banks. So financial capital production. Yeah. So I would I would argue, yes. We're not able to regulate centrally regulate the economy. Absolutely. But, actually, I would also argue we're not able to essentially resource the economy. And I think the centralization of capital production is also part of the tyranny of that process. And and then I think but this all relies on seeing the world as resource and units of assets. So it's also a worldview issue, which is if we see the world through a lens of resources and assets, I e, instrumentalizable things as opposed to agents in the world, so in a world of agency and agents, it's a fundamental shift at that moment in time. So absolutely on the side, I I would argue that we've been de facto moving towards a centralized economy without knowing it, because we couldn't regulate it.
Speaker 1
9:00 – 9:51
Yeah. And, you know, you've you've spoken a lot about, the idea of sort of entanglement and of of of kind of taking into our horizon of recognition other kinds of agents. I wonder if you could say a little bit a little bit about that, a little bit sort about the sort of idea of, of entanglement and what that means for how you think about the individual person and and also the idea of other kinds of agents. Because it it strikes me that this dovetails quite importantly with, with what we've just been talking about regarding sort of, regulation and resourcing.
Speaker 2
9:52 – 15:47
Yeah. No. Absolutely. So, I mean, so let's sort of this is caricaturesque, but it's illustrative of a purpose. If we let's imagine a piece of land. The land has a red line boundary or boundary of ownership, which is in our registry. Okay. Now there's a tree on that land. That tree is a cherry tree. That cherry tree actually mutually blossoms with other cherry trees. Mhmm. So now if you chop down that cherry tree, you reduce the blossom capacity of the whole system. It's your part of the commons thesis in many ways. Or whether if you look at that land, that land has multiple beneficiaries in terms of who who has the right to destroy the soil of that land, which has taken 10,000 to build. Or if you look at the water that is actually passing through that land and is actually being purified or contaminated depending on how the land is used. So that land has many relational, interdependencies that we basically divide and break up into units of rights and infinite resources that don't recognize their relational interdependencies. And in the process, what I would argue, we've reached a tipping point where the impact of all those microvialences so if you look back at, I think you live in LA. If you look back in Los Angeles and whatever, nineteen seventies, '27 nineteen seventies, the amount of trees in Los Angeles. And if you look at the kind of destruction of trees because of just few planning law changes, which meant that actually those trees were removed, Those micro changes have become those micro rules shifts are becoming so dominant that they've shifted the tree canopy of Los Angeles massively, like massive numbers. So why use that as an example? You could talk about London's front gardens. The front gardens have been replaced by car parking spaces, and we've lost vast amounts of absorbable land, which is actually absorbing rain and dampening, dampening floodwater risks and other things. So these microvioences, which in themselves are nothing but cumulative, we have systemic effects. And in a way, the challenge for us is that our theory of governance, is you know, there's a two way argument here. The one is that our theory of governance is not able to regulate those things. The second point I would argue is that, you know, if you took a more if you took an alternative perspective on it, you could argue the nature of property is so fundamentally regulated that, actually, there is very little dominion left. Mhmm. And it's poorly regulated. So you could make an argument, and I think some people would, and I want to acknowledge that for the sake of completeness of the debate. Somebody would say, well, hold it. I can't do anything with my land without some form of permission. I can't actually I need to get licenses for construction. I need to get actually, for sale, I need to register the sale. For, for mortgages, I need to get an insurance. I can give you a full stack of quasi permission systems that are regulating this landscape, which leaves very little situational responsibility. So you could say we've removed the benefits of stewardship because, actually, we removed the embodied rights and the responsibility to the system and regulated them, And we've effectively maximized six that are using the system at the same time. So it's a it's a double problem that we've reduced inherent governance as well as reduced inherent agency in the system. And I'm using it just as an example to illustrate that I think our theory of divisibility, you know, to construct a theory of property, you have to be able to objectify something. Then you have to, you know, to give it a boundary, objectify it. You have to then give yourself distance. So you have to create a permission landscape of violence. And this is a cultural thing. Like, you know, the the analogy I use is the construction of perspective in in many ways. I mean, this this is arguable. The construction perspective was a thesis of distancing and objectification. And that objectification and distancing, it permitted a theory of violence. And it also permitted the theory of classification. So you could classify things. You could disentangle things. So this is we've been living through this kind of world view paradigm, which has engineered vast spaces of violence, but it's also engineered vast possibilities or combinatorial possibilities that never existed before. And I think we have to we have to acknowledge both these things. And I think for the completeness of the debate, I think we have to acknowledge those things. So we have to acknowledge that the theory of property is constructed. The distribution of wealth and the distribution of power has probably never seen before. So because we've actually distributed capabilities of being quasi sovereign, so, you know, to be, to have the right to vote was originally a construct based on whether you owned your land because it was seen as a fundamental theory of fief fiefdom or you having sovereignty on land and thereby being independent and being sovereign in some thesis. So you could argue, and the industrial state actually created that theory of sovereignty through other mechanisms and other forms of kind of welfare mechanism and other things to create ethereal or synthetic sovereignties. So I do think I don't want to throw the conversation off. I just wanna acknowledge what it's done, acknowledge the violence systemically it's created, and acknowledge the need for a new parallel conversation, which I think is required. I think this is the work that, you know, radical change and DM have been doing over the end with Margaret. Levy's team and from Stanford have been doing some of the stuff, which I think is really interesting and important.
Speaker 1
15:48 – 17:57
Yeah. And so what when I when I think about this idea of of of agents, it strikes me well, there's it there are two important questions that jump out to me. One is the question of how to represent agents, like, how agents show up in an institutional way, how they're represented. But I think I sorta wanna bracket that one for a second because it there's an important there's an important complimentary question, which has to do with rights and responsibilities. Because it it seems to me that, you know, when we try to imagine well, first of all, there's just this sort of important, distinction between rights and responsibilities that maybe we should, like, lay a little bit of a little bit of foundation foundation for. Right? So, you know, for example, if you if you think about a if you think about a, medieval sort of system, right, there is a there is a way in which, at least in some ideal sense, the, the ruler is supposed to have some responsibility towards the rule. Right? And you you can kind of I I think you can, and so, you know and that's the responsibility is a very different sort of thing than rights. Right? Rights are basically, you know, sort of predefined areas in which the the implication is that you have no responsibility. Right? The the the wielder of the right has no responsibility within the contours of the right. So, so for example, when I think about agents being represented, like, nonhuman agents being represented in a property system, one thing that seems really important to me is, you know, not only how do we give those nonhuman agents rights, but how do we how do we make them capable of holding us to our responsibilities to them?
Speaker 2
17:58 – 19:35
So so, for example, does that make sense? Yeah. It totally does. I I would say if you look at a legal corporate, a legal corporate has responsibilities. You could argue the corporate form is a precursor to computational agents. So you could argue, and I think this is the way I would construct the debate, is that, you know, we're already living in a computationally designed world. It's called corporate organisms. And now what we're moving to and they have responsibilities. So the kind of question is how is those responsibilities governed, insured, managed? So I I do think we have we have, examples in the current system that do hold those things in a nonhuman system. Right? So a corporate, you could argue, is a legal construct, and it does hold responsibility and contracts that responsibility in different formats. The question is, can we can we construct those rights and responsibilities in a corporate, through a comp computational landscape, and what would that do? I think it opens up a really interesting question. And and what is the extent of rights and responsibilities that can be constructed through computational possibilities? And what is the nature of those rights and responsibilities in terms of their parametric contingent capability contingent capacities and other frameworks that are opening up over there? But I just wanted to say, is there a so is there a parallel that we can draw upon, and the role of insurance and other things and sort of processes and other forms that we can draw there? Right.
Speaker 1
19:36 – 22:07
Well, for, I mean, for example, one, you know, one conversation that this maps onto for me is the conversation about about partial common ownership. Because, I mean, yeah, sort of the idea in partial common ownership is that you can take a, an asset and sort of split it into two pieces. One of which is in the market. One of which is nontransferable. One of which is very much outside of the market. Right? And the one the one that is outside of the market is, you know, the idea is that that should be held by, by a, a network, right, or sort of a, you know, a non non individual, non economic actor type agent, to which the responsibilities of stewardship or the duties of stewardship are owed. And, so do you think, like I guess there are two sort of questions here. You know, one is one is, do you think that that technologies like AI and better sort of information processing technologies and things like that. Do you I'm curious your thoughts about the potential for those kinds of technologies to represent nonhuman agents. And then another sort of a meta question, which is, like, how do you how do you think about the worry of of, sort of, you know, just creating some other imperfect representation of something that can't quite be perfectly represented. Do you think that do do you think that it's, you think that the the steps that we should take are, simply to do the best we can to sort of represent different kinds of of agents in in our networks of relationships as best we can and continue to try to improve those representations? Or do you think that there's some sort of, fundamental way in which in which that's impossible or it's the wrong route or it's it's dangerous? I mean, there's this is a super hard question, but I'm I'm I'm just curious sort of how you how you think about that.
Speaker 2
22:08 – 29:07
Yeah. No. It's, it's a great question, and and you're right. Super hard. I think there's there's a couple of promises to it, which I think are kind of worth us digging into. The map the map will never be the terrain. Yeah. So I think the question for me is always not whether the map can never become the train can never become the train, but when is the map useful? And the second part so so where is the utility of the map? I think it's really important to define. And and then the second part of the question, which I think is perhaps even more interesting perhaps, is I think sort of and, again, this is slightly controversial, so I accept, you know, critique on this. But my reading on sort of computational technologies and, say, machine assisted decisions and other things is not that machine assisted decisions are bad. It's just that machine decision decisions codify our historic biases and replicate those historic biases. So if you and, actually, they tend to be still better than human decisions, because we can actually once we are aware of that codification bias, we can actually do something about it. So become conscious of our biasing and thereby actively do something about it. Whereas human systems like, you know, I think the great example is a judge after 12:00 after you know, just before lunch was giving very bad sentences just because he would get hungry. And so his sentence structure was actually really terrible. And just by declaring that to his declaring his own bias to him, actually allowed him to become an informed agent of change. So, you know, what I like about that is that that's an ennobling technology. That's a technology that allows us to recognize our own capacities and actually help us improve us. And I think there's a kind of really interesting role of how we're using decision structures. And are we using them as ennobling technologies? Are we using them as control technologies? Are we using them as scale technologies? And these are fundamentally different types of theories of technology. So I wanna just sit there a little bit because I I do think there's too much, and I do think the theory of technology is an ennobling device is actually very powerful. A map which is ennobling as to our behaviors and our conscious behaviors, a map that shows us the dependencies of that cherry tree with other trees, the map that actually informs us to becoming better agents in relationship is a pretty interesting map thesis. And so I I see the map as an ennobling technology as opposed to a control technology. And I think often when we think about these landscapes, we think about agents as control technologies, frameworks, as opposed to ennobling technology framework. So that's one dimension. Second dimension, I think, is that, you know, you you you you and you you'll know this better than I will not. But, you know, right now, we can take a piece of land and take, its environmental services as easements and the rights of those environmental services easements and give them to a third party. That's third party. We can assign those easements in terms of being guardian. I think the the challenge here is so, legally, that's a construct that can be done. They're difficult. There's there's some fiscal friction in there, tax tax friction in there. There is some there's some legal costs in there in terms of being able to construct that. But let's imagine we you know, it's legally viable. There's some friction that need to be resolved, which can resolve. But the challenge, I think, which is more problematic or more difficult is we're back into centralized verification models. So we're back into throwing those easements to a body and a body which is then having to understand computational positional sort of appropriateness. How do these different easements, the water, the other things, how do they intersect, how do they work together, how they work together in climate change, in microclimates. So the kind of the problem we've yes. We've made competition smarter with satellite technologies and other things, but we're still in that same paradox of centralized governance problems and not looking at the entanglement problem. And I think this is where I think the role of special computing and other things will become critical, and I think ennobling frameworks. If that framework is an ennobling framework, I think it becomes a different type of device rather than a control device. It becomes a kind of an empowerment and and justice defined device. And then what are the deep incentives of a system? So, you know, there's a really brilliant, yeah, you probably noticed, but in, Swedish law, I think it was that if the thickness of your soil had increased, your inheritance tax was reduced, if not made zero. If your thickness of sword had gone down, then you had an inheritance tax. I you'd constructed a liability for future generations. Yeah. Which I so so the kind of question that and even that, you know, do you century tax? That's a really interesting question. I'm really interested in what if there's, you know, what what if that land has a a wallet, which means that you've created a deficit against the future in that wallet. So it's all fixed centrally accumulated by government, the distributed handover. And if that land is handed over to a third party, you have to make full of that wallet for that handover to occur. So the protocols are agreed, but, actually, the resource is not centrally allocated and centrally distributed. I think these are the sort of spaces that we need to play in in terms of ennobling technologies, distributed fiscal mechanisms, and sort of civic fiscal mechanisms that construct these sort of incentives in different ways. And I'm I'm playing live here in terms of actually just thinking this problem through. But that's where I think we and that's that's I think my intuition is moving towards ennobling systems and then distributed incentive systems in a way that actually empower us in deeper ways and invite us to be our better selves. I mean, you know, nobody wants to be in societies where we are incentivized to do harm to each other because, you know, in a land of in a land of retribution, there's a land full of blind people. Right? So the the question for us is, like, how do we create ennobling frameworks which are just and I think moving to these ennobling frameworks, I think, is really interesting. And then if we can move simultaneously to this intergenerational or, sort of accountability structures, which don't necessarily pass through state, which we can do now, technically, it's it's not a problem. I think we can start to create a new form of justice in there. Can you say a little bit more about that, about accountability
Speaker 1
29:07 – 29:09
structures that don't pass through state?
Speaker 2
29:11 – 30:23
Well, like I said, like, you know, we currently so for example, if your land is degraded, you have an inheritance tax. You pay that inheritance tax to the state. It needn't be the state. It could be you have a deficit in a wallet attached to that land and that property register, which is a distributed register. And in that framework, actually, that deficit that's created prevents you buying or selling that land, till that till that deficit is is controlled. So there are protocols which are centralized, but the flow of resources doesn't have to be centralized, or not centralized. I mean, they could be mutually agreed. There there are other frameworks for mutually agreeing. I I don't think we can ever in any form of societal system, there are certain things which are collectively decided and certain things which can be distributed and decided. I think our capacity to move these things is is changing quite a lot. So in that moment, you don't actually have to shift results with the state in that thesis. You ship your your obligations are visible in your land in new formats. So this creates a new form of, new form of obligation to intergenerational responsibility that can do loads you can do loads of interesting things with those sorts of frameworks.
Speaker 1
30:26 – 35:21
So so I wonder, I'm I'm just curious, like, how you think, how you think we can think about constructing sort of systems in which we these sorts of duties and rights and responsibilities between human agents, nonhuman agents, collective agents, and so on. I would I'm curious just how you think about the systems in which those are those are mediated. In other words in other words, yes. It could be it could be protocols. It could be it could be many protocols. It could be, you know, there could be some you know, there there's, in at least in the short term, inevitably, some kind of interfacing with this with state systems that has to that has to happen. And, in many ways, I mean, this seems like the most the sort of, trickiest part of the of of the problem for me. Because when we set up these basically, in order to in order to be able to speak to one another, right, in order to be able to sort of communicate with other humans, first of all, or with, you know, nonhuman agents that have, that that that show up in property structures, we need some sort of a of a common language. You know? And that could be, provided by the state. It you know, relatedly, it could be a an economic system, you know, so a a money system. It could be a, a technical system. Could be a, you know, a shared a shared protocol of, you know, a a a blockchain or something. And one of the, I mean, just to sort of lay my own cards on the table, I mean, I think one one thing that I worry about when I you know, and I I'm asking questions I don't have the answer to because I I think that's sort of what we need to do. We just need to have these, you know, have these explanations. But I I think that basically, I sort of worry about any of these systems becoming sort of an ungovernable autonomous force that mediating our relationships. So, so for example, if we choose to use a monetary system to to to govern our relationships and, you know, our our choice of the of the monetary system, is going to, is, you know, will will result in, the biases of that system, sort of in in, putting a thumb on the scale in the mediation of all of our relationships. Right? You'll you'll end it'll you'll end up creating power concentrations that are engendered by that system, and and and so on and so forth. And there's kind of a there's sort of an, there's sort of a lack of susceptibility or a sort of a, you know, to, to our, to to to to governance in in some of these systems, if that if that makes sense. Right? Like, you know, for exam you know, for what I mean by that, to to make that more concrete, I mean, we can govern as, you know, we can govern a small group of people, becomes harder to govern a huge group of people, becomes almost impossible to govern like an international monetary system. Right? And, and so I I you know, what what what occurs to me is is is a kind of need to make these governance structures, not necessarily more geographically local, but somehow more sort of more sort of vulnerable and susceptible to to the, to the to to input, to governance, to sort of, you know, moral conversation, between different kinds of of of agents. And, I'm I'm just curious how you I'm just curious how you think about that. I mean, how how can we how do you, how do you think about creating structures that mediate property relationships which are, you know, sensitive to different sorts of notions of the common good or different kinds of of, you know, moral concerns and and it sort of resist, automatism.
Speaker 2
35:23 – 43:00
No. I that's a great question again. I think there's so I think there's there's multiple things in this. So when we talk about governance, I think, you know, sometimes people's heads go into a senate, a congress hall. So they almost default to what I would call some form of representative agreement space and legislative space that, governs the system. That is, of course, one thesis of gov governance. And there are other models of governance on the table as well. So that's one model of of human interaction governance systems. Other models are plurality. So, actually, if something is in opt optimal and variable and interoperable, actually, you get governance by evolutionist mechanisms where you support the evolution of counter positions and new positions effectively, theoretically a market market and optimality model. And that requires, again, some form of legislative frameworks to create the frameworks in which those things evolve, but that's an abstraction of the play. And then you can argue that, you you can move even further into the system at the protocol level. So I think there's a kind of thesis of where we choose to govern, which I think is really interesting. Mhmm. And I think sometimes we over choose to govern what I would call direct you know, and above it is participatory governance, real time participatory governance, which is, you know, which has constraints in in and possibilities in itself. So I think there's a kind of an arc of governance that I think we need to sort of keep hold of. And then I think there is what I would call at at root level if I was gonna draw a philosophical art is some form of, idealized sort of fully embodied when when the actor is so fully embodied in the flows and the reality of that system. It's nondivisible to the system. So its incentives and the system's incentives become quasi one. And at that moment in time, the theory of governance no longer has to be an imposition theory. It's an embodied theory of governance. So which is what you could argue ecosystems theoretically operate into or stabilize to those functions. So I I wanted to lay out that art because I think the kind of paradigm of governance is is multiple. And I and I think the question that I think we're facing is is, one, how do we transition from our theory of governance to a broader theory of governance? And second, I think what I would say is the the pluralizing of that stack of governance. I think too often, we default to legislative this the deliberative legislative frameworks as a theory of governance rather than looking at the full scope. And you could argue that even the full scope of, you know, protocol based governance, how do you build and most of these things are static systems. They're not learning systems. So you've got a first order problem of where they operate in the governance regime, and they got a second order problem that they're not fundamentally learning systems. So a legislative piece of vehicle isn't inherently led learning orientated. It's orientated around execution prediction of problem and execution of, of solution without any form of dynamic learning frameworks, which means that you tend to build a legislative model, realize its failures five years long, try to adjust those failures through a legislative landscape. So there's a sort of second order problem is how do you build these frameworks from a learning onto orientation and then build the governance or inherent process governance to allow us to be clear. So the only reason I'm laying that out is I I think we need to have the conversation of governance in a much in a in a full spectrum sense. And then I think that opens up as you rightly say, a whole question about the right type of governance questions for the right type of, problem spaces. Yeah. Because I think there are certain things that can be embodied governance things that actually don't require governance in a way they are embodied and tangled realities. There are certain things which require some form of, participatory, some things which can be representative, some things usually can be, protocol driven. You know, if we can go through the stack and we can operationalize in different ways. And I think our challenge as society is to be able to appreciate those stacks. Because I think at some levels of protocol based governance frameworks, which looks at, you know, I don't know, how climate change risk is being managed by different countries. Right? So different strategies in managing climate change risk. Because we're now entering, what I would argue is a is a multi perspectival transition strategy. America will go through an asset based approach. Europe will go through a supply and demand integrated approach, and Middle East will go towards an offset approach where hydrocarbon energy is significantly cheap, and, hence, it will look at offset technologies which allow it to do a transition. So these are different transition strategies, different governance is on those strategies, but they're creating different forms of interoperable risks at a planetary scale. So how those risk protocol has been integrated and understood in a complete sense and how they offset between each other because those risks are offsetting into each other in different formats. And so some some are taking present day capital risk, some are taking future planetary risk on the table and other formats. So it so what I'm saying is that some of these things can be managed at the protocol level in terms of accounting structures and sort of, balance balance of scorecards effects. Some of these can be operationally managed. And so I would I would love us to have a sort of a more complete thesis. And in that, I hope that we can create sort of why I'd call as much as possible this idea of embodied governance framework. So where your entanglements with the system that you're living in are so rich and rich and independent that your incentive system become one to one. So the deabstract, the nonabstract it. And that could be machine nonabstracted, a corporate that's fundamentally in stewardship of the land and not able to sell that land, and it's a different thesis of stewardship. A thousand year co corporation. Right? Let's imagine it through government. A Japanese corporation stewarding a piece of land, which is a thousand year, which is non tradable, which, you know, as you've never as you know, like, you know, you weren't able stately homes in The UK weren't able to be bought or sold, and it was only the trading of them that changed their dynamics and all sorts of things. So I wonder what if we looked at the full paradigm of of governance available to us, what that opens up. And and I I think in the conversations of centralization versus decentralization, I I think the the the reality is we are increasingly getting greater capacity to decentralize, and simultaneously, we're getting greater capacity to centralize. Yeah. Those two things are happening simultaneously. And the question then becomes is if we're centralizing certain things, I think what we are moving into is a multipolar world, which means that there is no there's no singular power source that's going to be able to drive the rules based order anymore. And in that context, all of these things are going to be what I'd call opt in infrastructures. So we are moving into what I would call opt in, regulatory systems. And that means that the incentive systems behind them have to be generated to be radically incentive orientated. So we're gonna we're no longer in the homogeny of single point power, which can execute and drive adoption. We're going it's gonna be opt in, regulatory frameworks, which I think is gonna be a completely different thesis of how these things all are organized and developed. I don't know what that looks like, but I just describing, I think, where we're ending up in many ways.
Speaker 1
43:00 – 43:45
So when I when I imagine that, what I imagine is sort of basically people, people or institutions opting in to relationships of duty and responsibility with, with nonhuman kinds of of agents and things like that. Right? So, you know, we might, for example, we might we might decide that opting into a relationship with a with a piece of land or with an ecosystem or with or with a house is, is is preferable to sort of being, blown on the winds of the of the open market or something. Is that sort of the idea?
Speaker 2
43:46 – 45:55
Exact exactly. And and I think in that model, your economic theory fundamentally changes. So you're no longer owning the land, but you're in stewardship of the land. Yeah. So be an extractive agent. So the field it becomes really critical. So these are not meant because I think one of the big problems that whenever we've done looked at any of this worldview, we've largely ended up creating what I would call our rent seeking systems, rent seeking agents, in the model. So the question of how we govern these agents to be actually radically transparent, radically auditable, self balancing agents, They are not there to maximize extractive capital. Multi capital system, they're governing multi capital flows as opposed to single financial cut. You can start to think about a new class of agents, which are activated as trusted intermediaries. You could argue it's just the contract glorified. Right? You you could argue that the theory of the contract has become glorified into an agent based, negotiation system, which is able to do more than it's historically been able to do. So that's where intuitively, I think I I I think this and what that means is that we're talking about new forms of positive intermediaries, micro intermediaries, rather than massive intermediaries, which you've got, like banking systems and regulatory systems. We're talking about specialized micro intermediary systems acting as micro trust, ennoblement frameworks for parties, multiple parties. So if we look at it through that lens, it sort of allows us to conceive it in a different landscape. It's like spatial micro intermediaries, autonomous agents which are acting as trusted bodies with different forms of accountability frameworks and, you know, radical audit auditability, automatically doing white hat sort of audits and other things and to be able to check and verify them. And that sort of that framework opens up a different way of governing the world, and it also means that we start to yeah. And I think we open up a pathway to this kind of wide. What I'm very interested in is ennobling systems. Systems that invite us to be our better selves rather than systems that invite us to be our worst selves in in in terms of society. So invite us to be our better selves in deepest formats. Yeah. And challenge and and vary that.
Speaker 1
45:56 – 48:14
So, I mean, the the question that I asked earlier about sort of whether we're worried about, you know, creating some new map territory problem when we represent nonhuman agents, you know, again, to sort of lay my own cards on the table. And I'm not sure about this. This is I think it's a very deep question and a very hard one. But but my my intuition is that, that, it's probably not a bad idea for us to try to represent these the, you know, these non nonhuman agents and interests in as rigorous of a way in as rigorously as we possibly can and and enter into relationship with them. That seems the reason that that seems preferable to me than just sort of abandoning the problem as insoluble is that at the end of the day, we are in relationship with nonhuman agents, whether we represent those relationships or not. And, and so what strikes me is that, you know, this this kind of effort, this kind of effort to build property systems that represent these kinds of interests and take them and identify them, strikes me as preferable to abandoning a problem because, because it's it's like trying to create a language. It's like trying to create a language in which we can communicate, things that matter. When we do that, we are abstracting a little bit. We are we're necessarily abstracting a little bit. But, basically, if we don't abstract, right, if we don't abstract, then the the communication loop that will that ultimately manifests itself is the least abstract communication loop possible, which is basically violence, catastrophe. Right? You know, in other words, the the most basic way that we communicate with nonhuman agents is when we is when one destroys the other. Right? And so I'm I'm totally agree. Does that make sense? No. I was gonna say two things.
Speaker 2
48:15 – 50:20
I I would say it. And I think in terms of abstraction, definitely, we're abstracting. I think the problem with abstraction is what I would call two things. One is, static abstraction. Yeah. So analog abstraction is static. I think we can genuinely talk about learning abstraction. So abstractions will not continually agent, learning learning modalities. So, you know, we talk about generative AI, but actually you can talk about continuously learning systems, which I think changes the the problem of abstraction and makes it different. And I think the other part is what I would call the role of spatial computing or spatial spatial, specialization of our computational bureaucratic systems. Because currently what we've had is centralized bureaucratic systems as per specialized bureaucratic systems. And a specialization of that capability also allows us to look at situational variation at a much more granular level and a much more relational level. That bureaucratic capability hasn't existed. And so when you combine those two things with with what, you know, what I would call our you know, if you say, let's say, Vision Pro or Apple Vision Pro. Apple Vision Pro is fusing the map and the territory and overlaying it. So when you put these two frameworks together, I think the map and the territory are becoming augmented systems now, and that augmentational power is becoming more interrelational. So I think those two things are going to change the paradigm of how we interface with these problems in different ways. So I think you're absolutely right. An abstraction in itself in itself is not the problem. The problem is when you abstract and you remote disentangle the rights and responsibilities or the embodiment of those rights and responsibilities, and by, ownership. It's when they become asymmetric and they both become tradable in the asymmetries. That's when the problem starts. So attraction also allows us to be see things in different formats. So I think there are there are evolutions of our theory of abstraction that are happening as a result of our computational capabilities that I think really worth, sort of inputting into that.
Speaker 1
50:20 – 52:00
Yeah. I I I agree. I mean, to me, it's about, you know, abstraction is, like many things, something that we need to sort of find a balance within. You know, we can you you can you can abstract to that there are dangers in abstracting too far and dangers in abstracting too little. And, I think that that's, you you know, the sort of financialization of everything is a is a is a great example of abstracting too far, of, excessive abstraction. And, I think that, you know, at least to me, these kinds of these kinds of new property systems as well as new monetary systems are about sort of finding the right level of abstraction to, to represent to be able to represent a more more harmonious relationships, basically, between between people and and and, as well as, you know, nonhuman institutions, systems, and so on. The you you've, I've I've heard you express some very interesting ideas about, sort of, embodied information and the idea that that, that there are kinds of information in sort of embodied cognition that, that are unique, that don't find their ways into our at least many of our abstraction systems.
Speaker 2
52:02 – 58:29
I wonder if So I I think what I'm trying to get to is that our theory of, so a couple of things. I I think when I talk about embodied intelligence, it's the recognition that is the physical, body component of intelligence, I. E. The agent component of intelligence, which is, like, also a key function of how we build that. So our ability to affect the world and see the effects of it and sense the effects of it, that craft loop is actually a theory of intelligence in itself. And then that those dimensions of how we affect the world are multiple. There's a physical dimensions. There's emotional dimensions. You could argue this. There's language. There's all sorts of different ways that we can actually sort of centrally engage, react, and embody in those cycles. And then they're also spatially, contextually variant. And that's why I think most of our theory of intelligence has been towards, I think, towards universalized intelligence, single points of truth, single points of proof rather than embodied multidimensional perspective. So as we talk about multiple currency system, multi intelligent systems are going to be a key factor. So that's where and I and I think it's important at a moment like this when a type of intelligence is getting so much significant power, we're still able to do so extraordinary things with it, that we start to now diversify our thesis to recognize the multidimensionality in terms of actually recognizing what the new human economy. And then thereby thereby what becomes really interesting is that how can machines play a role to be not control oriented to it, but ennobling frameworks to actually invite us to be actually our fuller, more human selves. And that, I think, is a different type of symbiotic relationship with machine human systems than there is a control which actually reduces us to bad robots in a way rather than actually ennobling us to be extraordinary humans, which are being machine assisted to be even more extraordinary enriching and exploring the full dimension of our capabilities. And that also puts us as agents of craft rather than agents of, instruction. And I think that's a different type theory of agency. So I think that's a that's, I think, an important thing. One thing I did wanna go back to, which I think is really important, is a lot of what you and I have been discussing, the agentification of the world around us and the computational capacity that, you know, that's opening up, it is a bit back to the future. As in, it is, a worldview that existed, in in pre enlightenment times where the dominion of the world was not constructed in that thesis. We had whether it's fairies, or we we had all sorts of other frameworks of engaging and seeing the agentification of the world around us, whether it was the nation of trees and indigenous landscapes or whether it's fairies and other forms in in in sort of Irish and Gaelic landscapes. We had these mythic, symbolic, real, agent creation view worldviews to which we had a different theory of engagement. And the theory of interface with that worldview was different to our theory of interface in a worldview of dominion and territory mapping and the territorialization and the cartography world view and the distant world view. So I think some part of this spatialized, Asian fied world is a back to the future in terms of being able to see and rhyming. This is a rhyme with the past, not the not the adoption of the past, and recognizing that there are patterns that we can learn of models of success in those sort of behaviors. So I also want to acknowledge that this is not a you know, like nothing else. This rhymes with the part of human history, and I think what computational capacity will give us is the capacity to be able to create that, maybe driven, at a degree of planetary interoperability that's never existed before to put kind of to kind of root James Lovelock in into this conversation. It almost allows us to build a kind of mass multi agent planetary consciousnesses, which is interruptible, highly plural, highly divergent, but in dialogue. And product and that and convergent and divergent simultaneously. Too often, we think about these things as convergent systems or control systems, but convergence and divergence in the dynamic dialogic senses are different thesis. So I think there's something else emerging at the kind of far end of this conversation, and I purposely bring it to the table recognizing it's a sort of a, well, extrapolated worldview to give us a possibility space, which I think is important. But I would argue that, you know, the final the the the big point for me, and it sort of rhymes with everything you said, it's very clear whether we like it or not. Our current theory of organizing and governance no longer works. And not marginally doesn't work. It doesn't work to the point of self terminating us. Right? It's a it's a sort of it's not like a marginal failure that we just need to correct. It's so systemic and so, structural that it is self terminating us. So unless we can actually change our theory of organizing and move towards ennobling frameworks, move towards actually, education of the world, which means that we live in treaty and in relationships of care because that's what the other thing is. When you move from relationships of dominion to relationships of agents, you become you move into relationships of care and co care between environments. And that's a different theory of organizing in the world, and it invites a different way of, the kind of the contractual frame or the relational frame becomes fundamentally different. And people like, Elizabeth Harrell's work on sort of economies of care. I think feminist economies conversations come into this in really radical ways as well, which I think is really interesting. So I think there's a heralding of a different world view in this, which I think is really interesting. And I I think we're going to have to look this far into the system, because I don't think this is a problem of of fixing up the kind of what I'd call who controls problem anymore. Mhmm. It's the nature of control that's broken. Mhmm.
Speaker 1
58:30 – 58:44
I think that's a great place to to close. As always, great to talk to you. And, I'm looking forward to, to continuing to to work on all these things, together with you. So,
Speaker 2
58:45 – 58:56
Honestly, it's a real pleasure, Matt. And thank you for everything that you do, and thank you for everything that RadicalxChange does in building these, these landscapes and building these conversation spaces. It's genuinely appreciated.
Speaker 1
58:57 – 58:58
Thank you so much.
Speaker 0
58:59 – 59:40
Thanks again to Indi Johar and Matt Pruitt. The Radical Exchanges podcast is executive produced by gee, Angela, Corpus and Matt Pruitt, and is co produced and audio engineered by myself, Aaron Benavides. This episode was produced and recorded by Matt Pruitt. If you would like to learn more about RadicalxChange, please follow us on Twitter at rad xchange, or check out our website at radicalexchange.org. And if you'd like to join in the conversation, we'd love to hear from you. So hop on our Discord where we have channels discussing topics like what you heard today, as well as topics like plural voting, community currencies, soulbound tokens, and more. There will be links for all of these in the description. Have a great day, and stay radical.