Yeah. Thank you, Sant, for the wonderful introduction. I'm very excited and thrilled today to be speaking to the Metagov community. Governance has been like an increasingly interesting topic for us here in The Middle East and North Africa. And, yeah, to give you, like, like like, first of all, are you seeing my presentation?

Okay. Perfect. In addition to the presentation, I will be sharing a link to the chat. Just give me a second. Yep. Here it is. So the link I that I shared is the artifact from my fellowship. And today's seminar will be like a brief high line overview of what we've been working on today. I'm I'm trying to cover as much as possible within twenty twenty minutes, but I still, like, would be very thrilled if you went on I read the whole thing. There's much more details to it. So yeah. We are techs here when we're joining the blockchain movement, like apparently, like so many other people, we were new joiners. We came from different career backgrounds. Like my my colleague and other cofounder was a risk assessment banker. I was a journalist and culture worker. So we joined the blockchain movement for many considerations. And this movement towards decentralization was one of them. So when we were founding TechSear, we have spent several months developing our ownership and our ownership model and our governance model, which we call the dynamic partnership protocol, which I will be talking about today and which the artifact is about. The artifact is a detailed documentation of this govern of this governance model. It offers like the configurations that we have in techs here, but also alternative configurations to meet other needs from other cooperatives and DAOs. So it it it has been interesting with our dynamic partnership protocol because, essentially, it was something that was supposed to guide us run techs here. But with time, as more people in the MENA region were getting interested in decentralized and horizontal governance, it started turning from like a governance model to a product that we were presenting and, like, not selling, but but but, you know, training people on presenting this idea of of of organization, of self organization, as well as working with other collective to iterate on it and to make it meet different needs. So let me start. Why why did we develop our own ownership model? Why didn't we go like other DAOs, release the governance token, develop like a tokenomics model, and just did that? Well, we were motivated mainly by three factors. First of all, like, we wanted to challenge the investors' economies that we live in today. Like, in today's economy, it runs on on on three main classes. Like, you have investors who provide seed funding and take risk, which is quite essential for new business businesses to strive. We have workers that take, like, these abstract or theoretical ideas and turn them into a viable and competitive product or service. And we have, like, the consumers who by choosing our idea our our product or service over other competitors, they they make our business viable and even profitable. But what happens is that instead of these three classes having equal salience way over the economy and over how the economy works today, the reality is that the economy is heavily skewed towards investors who who who who seeks to maximize profit over many other considerations, like creating fair and safe workspaces and also catering to the needs of of of consumers. And they do that through monopoly and through other strategies. So we wanted to develop an ownership and governance model that was like a worker maximalist that would give most of the power to to workers, more more precisely active and recent workers. So that was one of our motives. The other motive was we noticed with so many DAOs that once they airdrop once like a crypto project turns decentralized and airdrops their governance token to the community, give that enough time, and the community starts selling the governance tokens when it hits a certain high on the market. And then investors, whether institutional or individual, come and snatch those governance tokens from the market at a certain lower price. And we we end up with decentralization of DAOs. Like, at the moment of the airdrop, you might have, like, 20,000 different wallets holding your token, but give it a few months and you you you have most of your tokens concentrated in maybe a 100 or 200, wallets. So, we wanted to tackle that as well. We we we didn't want to issue a transferable governance token for that reason. We didn't want it to be sold with time and, and re centralize again. And lastly, and that's more relevant to us in MENA, was overcoming the capital barrier. Like in in many, many DAOs today, you need to buy in. You need to buy, governance token or utility token or other kind of token ownership token, maybe. So you can get into a DAO. And many people in the MENA region, wouldn't be able to do that whether because they're not quite convinced yet in crypto that they put their money in it. They want to get gain exposure in in safer way and less riskier way. And the other reason that in in countries like Egypt, people are very skeptical around the the legal status of crypto. There's strong governmental over governmental scrutiny over crypto purchases. So people would rather, like, not take that risk and buy crypto anyway and expose themselves to, like, investigation or something like that or or or or any any other type of scrutiny. So we wanted to envision and develop the type of DAOs, a framework for the type of DAOs where the main method of contribution and of buying in is through labor and not capital. You contribute labor. You get shares. You don't risk losing your money, and you don't risk getting arrested over buying crypto. So what is the DPP? And and what are we doing in this artifact, in this Gitbook documentation website that I shared? Like, first of all, as the name conveys the DBP, the dynamic partnership protocol is a protocol. This was inspired by the blockchain movement's tendency to move from trusting people to trusting laws and code. The idea that we can design a governance model automated using smart contracts or any sort of other sort of automation and not have to trust certain people with their subjective biases. So we we we are more reliant on a protocol than on, like, people in power. It's not like the financial manager or the operation manager have, like, a great great authority or great decision power decision decision making power. But most of that is organized and regulated through a set of protocols. And it's a set of protocols for blockchain edge cooperations, whether we cooperatives, whether they are real world cooperatives, DAOs, hybrids. Me, personally, I don't see, like, that great of a barrier between a DAO and a cooperative. I see one as an extension of the other. So it's for that type of entities that aim to to run-in a decentralized manner over the Internet or in real life and need a set of protocols to help the members navigate different aspects of the governance and ownership process. The scope of this artifact cover four main areas. Like, first of all, we talk about ownership. Then we move to talk about governance. Then we move to talk about work ethics and values. And lastly, we cover some of the main poolings that we use to facilitate the use of the dynamic partnership protocol. We have some web two tools like Discord and, and ClickUp. We have some web three tools like, like, DAOHouse, like Snapshot, like, Soana, Squad for funds management. So, I I I won't be talking in this call today in the seminar about the tooling side a lot, because it's pretty straightforward. People can get a good idea from on it from, the Gitbook website, but I will be tackling the first three, three areas mainly. And lastly, this documentation puts a great deal of emphasis on configurability. We're not presenting or selling the DPP in a certain configurations that people either take it or leave it, but we are presenting in parallel how we set it up and configure it at Txil, but also how different DAOs and cooperatives can set it up in different ways to meet their own needs and circumstances. So without further ado, let's get to the ownership part. In the ownership part, because we were responding to the to the great sway of investors over today's economy, I'm I have to go out and say it go ahead and say it that we maybe went a little bit too far in taking a labor maximalist approach. Like in the configuration we adopted in Taksir, we didn't turn to investors. We were bootstrapped. And Taksir is completely and always owned by its workers. And at the same time, the shares are not transferable. So when we issue shares to our workers or members, they are not able to sell it sell them or exit, which might be seen by many people as a bit too far of a of a step or a bit or a bit too radical in in concentrating the governance power within the team, but we were, like, very cautious towards the capital week. We didn't want the recent recentralization phenomenon happening again. So, we took that approach. However, we propose a hybrid approach where people can adopt the DBP, and still sell shares, to investors, but we present that with a twist. I don't think I have enough time to go into it with details, so I'm gonna just give a brief of the idea, which is I I admit it's a far out idea, but I I I would still like to to hear your takes on it. So we believe that when an investor invests in a project, there should be, like, an estimation of something that we're calling the the risk fulfillment threshold. That is every project would have a different risk level based based on circumstances. Like, if you're opening a franchise of McDonald's in a food court, in a mall, that's a low risk project because it's very likely to succeed even relatively. So the risk fulfillment special for that project would be low. But if you're starting a new layer one blockchain, that might be a very risky project because it it it would be faced with lots of established competition. So the idea is let's let's say we we we're talking about a Midwest project that that the investors agrees that they're looking to initially make 150% of their initial investment, and they would forego their governance rights before be beyond that limit. So if I invested 100,000 in a project, and again, like, 5% equity, once my equity value reaches $150,000 or the mix of equity value and dividends reaches $150,000, I maintain my ownership in the project. I still have ownership of the of 5% of the project, and I'm entitled to 5% of the profits. But my governance rights and my voting rights start moving back to workers in that project. The idea is that investors should have a say in how the project is run as long as they haven't made their initial investment and then some to cover their risk risk taking, their their level of risk taking. But beyond that, we believe that governance rights should move back to workers in a gradual manner. So that's all I'm gonna say for now about the hybrid approach. So returning to the labor maximalist approach that we took in tax year, we issue shares to our members based on the labor as they contribute to the DAO or or to the co operative as in to tax year. And these shares that we issue are non transferable. As I mentioned earlier, they are not liquid, and they are even not exchangeable between the members of the DAO. We can think about them as soulbound shares. Like, when you gain them, you you're the only one who can use them for voting or for profiteering. And then we made, like, a distinction between active and recent members on one side and former members, members who have been idle or left Txiv for a long time on the other hand. Because let's say I have worked at Txiv for a while, but then I stopped and now twenty years have passed. If I still have my shares at TxSeal, my relationship would be more of an investor than a worker relationship to TxSeal because I'm I'm receiving this passive income, and I would start to think again about how to maximize my profits from Tax Hill and would be pushing proposals and voting on proposals based on that interest and not largely on the interest of of current workers and consumers. And the other aspect is that if you join Tax Hill after twenty years, you have twenty years of issued shares that you need to share the returns of Taxid with that. Every time Taxid makes, like, $5,000, a large part of that, maybe 90% of that, will be paid to former members because they because they accumulated a large number of shares over the years, and only a little slice of the cake will go to active or recent members who are doing the actual work by the time. So this would demotivate later workers, and it will make them feel like they are employed by the former workers and not like equals. So we decided that the shares at TEXI will be would be erodible. They are not permanent shares. They expire based on certain circumstances. I will go into that with more details in a bit. But for now, I want to talk about how we can quantify labor in Taksi and how we determine how much share should we give to members based on the amount of work they contribute. So the first part of this process would be through share pricing. Share pricing would be by determining how many work hours do you need to contribute to gain one share. And a very simple and straightforward approach to tackle that would be to have fixed share pricing. Let's say all shares post 50 of work. So every time you contribute fifty hours of work, you get one share. But the problem with that is that early founders and very early joiners and members will accumulate a large number of shares based on the schema in the first year or so that later joiners, while they will have voting rights, voting rights will not be significant because it will take them a long time to accumulate a number of shares that will be significant facing the number of shares the founders have accumulated. So we decided to go with a gradual share pricing schema where shares become more and more expensive until they plateau as a seventh share. So at Taxis, the first share would cost you fifty hours of work. It's pretty attainable. We set it at a low price. So we motivate new members. It wouldn't take them a long time for them to get their first share to become official members to start voting and to get a sense of of their membership and partnership in the protocol. But after that, as the number of shares start increasing by decreasing factors, 1.5, then 1.4, then 1.3. There's actually no mathematical basis whatsoever to these factors except for making it gradual increase in the prices of of shares. And, lastly, when you hit the sixth and seventh share, the the price of the shares is plateaued at 180, work hours, and it, remains so adaptable. Adopting this shares pricing scheme out allowed new genres at Taxir to catch up to the older older members and to founders because, like, now all the members already accumulated more than seven shares.

to put in 100 more than seven shares, and now they have to put in one hundred eighty hours to accumulate every new share while new joiners are still in the early early shared zone, and they have to put in way less hours to to get to qualify for a new share. So as a result, like, right now, me and the other cofounder rally on only about 50% of the shares at Axiad, and the other 50 are distributed amongst the rest of the team. So that's about shares pricing. Beyond that, we needed a way to measure how many work hours every member was contributing, and our solution for that was monitored self reporting. So at the end of each working day, I remember at Taxil with the summon a a a a a a Discord bot that we developed at Taxil. We call it Taxil comrade as an inside joke. That's a long story right there. Anyways, so when you summon this bot, it presents you with a form. You need to fill in details about who you are, how many hours you have you worked today, on which project, under which kind of work, and if you have any documentation or further details on your work. And when you submit this form, two things happen. First of all, this card that you that you see on the on the presentation appears to all members. All members can know your work hours entry, and they can, see for themselves, check for themselves if there's any overbilling or any malicious billing, going on. And the other things that happens as this entry would go to this Google Sheet that is available for every member to view, but only to the administrative assistant to edit. And once there once we reach the end of the week, if no member objected and if the administrative assistant verified that the work entries look legit, as they get approved, our members get paid and get issued hours based on these work entries. So this is how we calculate how much hours every member is is contributing. We have provided a template of our sheets equipped with many with many equations to automate a lot of aspects. Like, you get automatically calculation of how many mem how many shares does each member qualify for based on the number of contributed hours and so on. Now let's move to the erosion mechanism. So we have something that we call the erosion threshold, which is currently set at one hundred sixty hours in consecutive three hundred and sixty five days or a year. So when a member is falls below that threshold, when they have contributed less than one month of full work within within any given consecutive year, they the the erosion mechanism gets triggered. And these members, their their shares targeting eroded at a pace equal to the number of years of idleness. So let's say I I have resigned from here. I have moved on to another project. Once I fall below that erosion threshold, I start losing my shares. In the first year, I lose one share. In the second year, I lose two shares beside the shares that I lost in the first year. So three shares in total. In the third year, I lose three shares plus the three shares I lost in the first two years. So six shares in total and so on until I run out of shares. So this way, like, older and former members don't become participants, but they receive what could be described as the dynamic pension. That if I have 30 shares in tax here, it will take them around, like, eight years to get eroded completely. And through this eight years, I would be receiving passive income from tax year, which could be viewed as a dynamic pension. So moving on to the next topic, governance. We we're tackling governance as something consisting of three main pillars, which are decision making, conflict resolution, and resource allocation. So as a decision making, there are different schools of thoughts on decision making. There's like democracy where everybody votes, whether it's weighted democracy or one person won't vote democracy. But then there's more nuanced and more schools of sorts that are more convenient to other arrangements like holocracy where there's local governance at the level of certain circles or democracy where most of the decisions are being made at the level of doers and practitioners. But because we are of a of a small number so far, we're going with simple wet democracies that everybody votes with their with the number of shares they hold. Of course, to set up a a decision making a protocol for your DAO, you need to consider different parameters and settings such as the quorum. And the quorum can can be set in two different ways. You can set it for the number of people, like for a vote to pass, 40% of of your members need to vote, Or you can set it based on the number of shares that 40% of the shares issued in your DAO need to be participating as a voting. We prefer shares, and we explain in the Gitbook website why we do so. And there's different other similar parameters such as voting threshold, and you can have different thresholds for different types of decisions. Like, for

day to day decision, you can have 51% or 60%. But for more vital decision like modifying your code of conduct or your ownership model, it could be up to 85 threshold. And lastly, you you need to clarify as the rights can serve with the voting process. Like, in Taxir, any member holding at least one vote gets to write. But then there's right rights to be clarified regarding delegation. Like in Taxir, anyone can delegate their voting rights, but they can only delegate them to a member holding at least three shares. So we don't encourage delegating to very recent and new members. This is, like, a very high level overview, but we go into this aspects with more details and with templates that people can modify and iterate on in the Gitbook website. Moving on to conflict resolution, we prefer to to take a decentralized approach to conflict resolution instead of appointing a personnel like HR or a third party company to provide these kind of services. We're talking about conflicts whether about whether between two members, a member and a client, a member and the DAO itself. And we have set up a detailed procedure that we included in the Gitbook website. This procedure consists of two levels of voting. In the first level of voting, the DAOs vote whether there has been a violation or not. And they vote on no violation violation tier one, tier two, tier three, or tier four. And each tier has a certain defined explanation. Like tier one is for light violation. Tier two is for repeated light violations or mild violations and so on. And once the DAO voted on whether there has been a violation or not and which tier is it, there's another vote to decide on which reparative and which punitive measures to be taken to address state violation, which are also predefined and clarified. So there's options for the DAO to choose from. The last thing I want to address here is crowd's wisdom versus majority voting. Like, in in areas like conflict resolution, as I said, when the DAO is voting, whether there's no violation or violation number one or tier one or two or three, We can go with majority voting. So if 40% decided they were a tier two violation, then we decide that there has been a tier two violation. But in this particular case, we we can assign a quantitative value to the options. So no violation would equal zero. Tier one violation would equal one. Tier two violation would equal two. And then we can calculate for the average or the median. I'm I'm not like expert in statistics, so I'm I'm afraid I'm misusing the right term. But that is to say that we calculate the weighted vote of the members. So 40% might vote for t t two violation, 30% might vote for t 30% might vote for no violation. So the average might be 2.3, and we run it down to to two. So it's or to one one point three. So we run it down to one, and we go with a tier one violation. So in here, we see a margin for play and for not using majority voting, but for using the average of the value of the of the voice people submit based on the number of shares they have and to consider the medium, which is much closer to the crowds wisdom approach. Lastly, we have the resource allocation sector. It's it's pretty basic. We have a hybrid approach for budgeting as the administrative assistants and the financial assistants collaborate on preparing a budget for a certain period of time for tax year. It's put on to a vote, and members either approve it and it's enacted or they disapprove it. And it's modified and then put to a vote again. And once a budget has been set, any member can can put a proposal to withdraw a certain sum from the budget, like from the inventory or from the travel budget. And the proposal is put to a vote and is treated depending on the result of the vote. Lastly, we dedicate an expansive section to ethics and values because we think they have a great deal to do with the crisis as the world culture is having around the world right now producing phenomena phenomenons such as the great resignation and quite quitting. So, like, a few research pure research around the the reasons behind the great resignation puts almost just as much emphasis on feeling disrespected as a workplace and lacking opportunities for career development just as much as being paid unfairly. So we believe like DAOs and operators should have a clear statement of values and ethical standards and and behavior and as well as measures and protocols to deal with any violations for these ethics and ethical standards. So what we propose is developing a member's handbook and a member handbook with in our case, it consists of four documents. It consists of an introduction that resembles a simple and straightforward manifesto. It says what Taxir is, what it does, what what does it mean to be a member in Taksir and such. Then we have a code of conduct where we explain what work ethics and value we uphold in Taksir, and we provide needed interpretation and clarification for the terms that we're using in the code of conduct such as what constitutes what constitutes a case of micromanagement, for example. So we have, like, three guidelines on how to address these problems and these phenomenons. In the code of conduct, we have many policies that are smaller than to have their own documents. Like, we have a physical safety policy that is quite simple because we don't have a physical place of work. So we're only discussing the nature of places we use to conduct public events in. But we have certain policies that have their dedicated documents, like the nondiscrimination anti harassment policy. It has it's it's own several built documents, which clarifies the decentralized procedures on how to determine any violations and any reparative and punitive measures on that level. And lastly, we have the ownership and remuneration presentation, which explains how the claiming and erosion mechanisms work. The share pricing scheme at Txir, as a delegation process at Taxir. We also clarify certain rules such as if you you need to hold a certain item of of tax years inventory such as a laptop or a hard disk or something like that. You mean, for example, to have at least three shares to qualify for that. So we we we cover these aspects in in this document. If you're if you're navigating the the Gitbook website we we developed, you will find an additional part on tooling on the apps that we use on the Discord bug that we developed and some of the essential code for that bug and for the Google Sheets that we developed with all the equations that automate a lot of the work that we described in here and a lot of the processes. And it's quite more expansive. It's around 10,000 words long. Yeah. If if if this presentation intrigued you, I I highly recommend that you go and get, like, the full length version of it. And with that said, that's all I have to to share with you today about the dynamic partnership protocol. Thank you so much for listening, and I'm eager to hear from you.

Okay. Sure. So our flagship project so far has been Abjad DAO. Abjad DAO is a DAO that that came together as an alliance of four organizations led by TechSeal to develop the the first methodical and standardized Arabic glossary for blockchain and website terminology since creating and translating quality blockchain content to Arabic has been a great challenge in recent years. We worked on AzureDAO for a year. We released the initial version containing 600 covering 600 terms and translations. Around three months ago, we released it first in beta. We collected feedback from the community, and then we released an official edition about a month ago. And during the past month and a half, we were, working on propagating on propagating Abjut DAO because, like, getting adoption of the glossary is essential to push it to reduce transition dispersion and to unify the transitions that we're using in Arabic for blockchain terminology. And I'm very excited to say that it has been adopted by 16 different entities so far, largely MENA based the blockchain projects, but also by the Ethereum Foundation and by the Solana Foundation. And as I've heard while I was talking the Ethereum Foundations, they were developing a translation program and we would be consultants on that as well due to our success with Abjutta. So this has been our main success so far. Lately, we have been doing a lots of regulatory research with a collective of lawyers and legal researchers in the MENA region around local and regional considerations around regulating blockchain. You know, the MENA region have aspects such as Islamic finances, Sharia compliance, and and and other aspects. So we're tackling these issues in our research. And well, we do a lot of education projects like very recently about a week ago, we have launched MusDAO. MusDAO is a educational DAO for musician and music workers from the Arab region interested in exploring blockchain. It consists of three courses on blockchain, one on blockchain literacy, one on the intersections of blockchain and WebSphere with the music economy and industry, and one in, on career building in the WebSphere space, consisting largely of interviews of experts. And, we're gonna give attendees of these courses a while before we're gonna contact them and invite them to, to join a DAO to start exploring together what we can do as a Web three enthusiasts in the music scene in in MENA. We can, like, start a venue in Decentraland and start, like, onboarding Arabizations in the metaverse. We can have a decentralized record label. We can have there's also like a decentralized human platform coming out in this region called Mawja, so we can work with them as well. So that's one project we've been working on. TechSear is largely a project based to the number of our active members raise and fall based on the intensity of our work. At our peak, we're eight members plus an intern. And right now, we're around four members. But the the the the other four members haven't resigned. They're just not active at the moment.

Thank you a lot for the feedback. To be honest, we did have several issues with the complexity, particularly from our non, crypto enthusiast members or blockchain enthusiast members. Like, we have a media production team, for our educational videos those people does not necessarily come from blockchain background. And to them, it was overwhelming. It created, several steps of of of confusion. So I I can relate a lot to this to this reflection. And, yeah, that's definitely something we should we should consider simplifying and and, yeah, make it more of a back end than a front end. You know? Like

I'm I'm Go ahead. I'm sorry. Continue. Sure. Sure. Go ahead.

Alright.

Simplifying or kind of going very empirical and iterative. So I sort of make a distinction between you know, there's how you think about systems we control and understand, and that's called engineering. And then there's your how we think about systems we don't control and don't understand. And I kind of, you can call that systems thinking. And, like, how you do design is really, really different for each of those. You're sort of in the awkward hybrid right now, and I wonder if your options are in either direction where if you if you decide, okay. We're gonna do the engineering approach. We're going to feel you know, we're gonna approach this as if we understand it and control it, then, yeah, simplify and just be an engineer. Modules and and isolated parts that can be tested or loosely interconnected. Right? But then if you do wanna go, like, all in on, like, complexity and everything affecting everything, then for me, it sort of feels like,

deploy and watch and tune and make make little changes every week and come up with a really good system of seeing the effects of those changes as quickly as possible. The my concern I don't know if you know about the five whys. This is a design principle from systems thinking. You do know it?

Yeah. From from systems thinking, I'm not sure.

Okay. Five whys is just, oh, why did this happen? And then you come up with an answer. And then instead of, like, solving that, you ask, well, why did that happen? And then and why did that happen? And why did that happen? Why did that you have five times, and that's how that's, like, a method for finding root causes in, like, social systems that are very highly interconnected. And so this is so I brought up Cronovet, who kind of took the other approach of tiny modules that barely interact with each other, so very engineering. And even he has trouble with his participants trying to solve root causes of small bugs. I'm sorry, superficial causes. And then he knows the system well enough to find the root cause. So even in a simple system, you can have the the this problem of solving the wrong problem. And in the system with as many interdependencies as yours, I really go in the direction of of, yeah, wondering which way to which way you should go. It's very cool though.

Thanks a lot, Seth. Like, personally, I'm I'm way more influenced by system theory and system thinking than than engineering. So I appreciate, like, considering the dynamics that are coming into play and the interdependencies, as you said. But, yeah, it's it's messier, but it's closer to to to to my intellectual approach in general that to to to to deploy and iterate, as you said.

Okay. So I'll start with the later question. To be honest, to this to this point in time right now, we have things pretty much mixed up between the for profit and nonprofit parts. We don't have different governance, and we have the same shares in voting. You know, people attending their shares through working on for profit will vote on nonprofit projects. As tech seed grows, we might reconsider that. And we we already consider this binary earlier on whether we should have two different siloed that was one for the for profit and one for the nonprofit. And how the expertise attend in one should translate to the other. Like, that maybe we have one person who's working on client acquisition, but they this they might acquire a lot of shares, but they might not be, like, best suited to to vote on the nonprofit projects, which are largely research on public good based. But, for the time being, they are, they are kind of mixed. Like, can you remind me again of the first question?

Yeah. It was returning to the point that some of our team members are not coming from blockchain back background. They're just doing their job and leaving. There has been a fair deal of resistance. Like, first of all, taxi provides a fair deal of autonomy. There's no layers of management. Like, you take a project, you provide the deadline, and you should deliver it within that deadline. But beyond that, not there's there's no much oversight going on. So this created for a bit of a hassle. People sometimes like like to be, like, not micromanaged, but managed to a certain extent, like to be followed up and and such. At same time, like like I said a minute ago, there is the complexity part created also confusion for the nonblock members. For the blockchain members, for blockchain background members, it was fairly exciting. They would engage in the in the design of the model. They would like, when we drafted the code of conduct, they had questions. They have they had iterations. They said, like, this this part was lucky. You didn't have a policy for, like, vacations and and and and notifying other members ahead of vacation and and stuff like that. So we had to incorporate that in. They they also had questions about delegation, which were very insightful. So it it it it gets us confused at times, like, whether we should invest more in in introducing our non blockchain members to blockchain mentality and blockchain as a movement so they become more aligned or we should remove some of the complexity to make the DPP work for non blockchain people in general that we should meet them at their half of the road instead of the other way around.

Yeah. I mean, we we invested in in two levels of adoption. We invested in in having MENA residents adopt a blockchain technology and cryptocurrency for the specific purpose of financial inclusion since, like one statistic that I keep, mentioning, 85% of financial transactions in MENA are carried out in cash. And that's that's a huge percentage in a word that's becoming cashless more and more every day. And that's because tens of millions of MENA residents are either underbanked or completely unbanked. So when it comes to promoting blockchain adoption that that our decentralized governance is doesn't interfere a lot or or or doesn't affect that aspect of our work a lot. But then we are also invested in the adoption of the blockchain movement that we have troubles in MENA organizing ourselves in in in in organizations where we're talking about nonprofits, for profits, NGOs. And we have also problems organizing ourselves ourselves and mobilizing ourselves in social change movements. You know, the the The Middle East is almost becoming infamous for the number of revolutions and protests arising every every other years in many countries, but still a little outcome and little sustainable improvement and democratization is coming out of the other end. So we believe that decentralization and decentralized governance and self organization is key to improving how we do things, whether in in the field of work and labor or whether in the field of activism and and and social change. So, yeah, that's one place we put a lot of emphasis on the fact that we're decentralized because we want to lead by example and show people that we can do it in a decentralized manner.

Okay. I'm available on Metagov Slack at Amaro, if I'm not mistaken, a, m m, a r o. And my email is amar@texir.xyz,a,mm,arattexir,taxir,uh,.xyz. I'll be very happy to hear from you. You can also reach us out at texir social media. As same spelling of the name, t a x a I r, and we'll be