Awesome. Let me share my screen here. I don't know if it's showing a title or not, but I don't even have one because these slides are so darn new. Now just let me make sure I can get all of you visible in my other screen. Awesome. So feel free to throw a hand up or what have you to interrupt me. Actually, I'm gonna pull up the chat as well just to ensure I can see all comments in real time. And so my actual title for this pace for this piece has three titles, an organizational coast theorem, which is constitutional constraints, increase in exit costs. To me, I use a world of zero exit costs in the paper to argue for a variety of conclusions about our collective organizations collective action organizations in practice. The third title, which probably is the least popular in this particular group, is why private firms aren't democratic. Although as I noted in the Medigov channel dedicated to the seminar, I'm interested in exactly this question because I think certain aspects of our ability to organize collectively have changed due to technology. And so I would humbly submit that if you hate the subtitle, consider it as why private firms haven't historically been democratic. And so one way the discussion might go surrounds the fact that some organizations now might be better governed democratically than more in a more centralized fashion because of technological change. The punchline of the paper, I don't like to hide the ball, is that I think I've developed what I call an institutional power law. And so within complex systems, an ordered an observable ordered regularity between two components of that system, even if you can't make a direct causal claim as to the nature of that, to me, that's my relatively simplistic take on what a power law is in complex systems. Blake, you may you may well have some strong feels on this, so I welcome input. It's interesting. Some complexity scholars are like, yes. I agree with your definition. Others say, absolutely not. And so I'm interested in in honing that component. Whether or not you think it's a power law, though, I do think I'm talking about a general phenomenon that faces all of our collective action organizations. Public government on every level and every form of organization that we formally constitute. So I'm not I wouldn't quite call this group today an organization. Block Science is an organization, and I have a contract with them. I'm a member of that organization for the purposes of that contract. Medigov, I see is approaching an organization, but this particular seminar group doesn't have clear, very well defined rules or into anyone can join. Anyone can exit. And so to me, this is more of what I would call a social group. What I am describing in this piece are formal organizations. So don't think the random concatenations of individuals that you happen to come up against in your day to day lives. What I'm talking about are formally constituted organizations at an impersonal scale. And so your family isn't what I'm talking about. Tiny organizations where everyone knows one another, and they don't need many rules articulated. Also not talking about that. I'm talking about the ubiquitous modern phenomenon of governance as emanating from impersonal constituted organizations. And so from those organizations emanate institutions as they're called in the vernacular of the discipline I write in, although increasingly I call myself a governance scholar, if anything. And so this was an interesting conversation I had with Nathan on Sunday at the Medigov brunch. So one motivating question that you might be able to take from my analysis is why is democracy emergent in public but not private orders? Nathan has an answer that I don't I at least don't fully agree with, and I'll get to that in a moment. But I think that there's something else going on here other than just capitalist oppression, plain and simple. And so the spread of democracy globally as a system of public ordering for public organizations is undeniable. And I see this as an emergent phenomenon because the performance of constitutionally constrained democratic orders suggests that it this form of governance is optimal if the chosen purpose of the organization is to be the government for a geospatially delimited region. To me, I take via the revelation of countries that adopt this system seem to do better, not all of them, but what is a core characteristic of the countries that have become prosperous over the course of the twentieth century? Arguably, with a few tiny dictatorships like Singapore and others as an exception, it's ones that embed elements of democratic ordering in their governance system. I don't think this is controversial. I'd be interested to hear if anyone on this call thinks democracy sucks for public governance. I don't think that this is a particularly controversial claim. What is controversial though is, well, if democracy is such a good system of governance, why haven't private firms adopted it? I've provided Nathan's alternative explanation here, although feel free to jump in, Nathan, if I'm making too much of a straw man of your position. But the private owners of capital have maintained a chokehold on the terms of private governance even as public orders have liberalized. So there's one narrative where it's just the capitalists say we wanna maintain control. We currently have power. Our structures will reflect that even if the public system is liberalizing, allowing the voices of the individuals to be heard. There's a couple reasons I don't find that explanation fully satisfactory. I'm not even sure if it's the dominant causal mechanism here. Indeed, I think something else is going on. That something else is the substance of my presentation. But a couple just quick counterarguments to the position that the reason that corporate governance or private governance has remained so centralized for so long is that effectively, I it it it if if you say it's capitalist controlling that and you're implicitly saying democracy would be better, democracy would be a more efficient system, that presents huge competitive gains to the one greedy capitalist who is willing to create a more decentralized form of governance for their firm. If you're positing democracy is a more efficient form of ordering for all organizations, my contention is it just takes a few capitalists to defect from the collusive equilibrium of centralized control, and they will capture all of the supposed gains of democratic governance. So to me, the stickiness of this equilibrium as a function of self interest on the part of capitalist controllers of private organizations, that doesn't hold up based on the motives of self interest that we endlessly ascribe to the owners of capital. And so it it it effectively and I'll Blake, I just saw you come up in the chat. I will return to my power law at the conclusion. That was just a preview. That's like, that's where I'm heading. If that doesn't make sense yet, don't worry. But another issue is that access to private organizational forms has liberalized immensely since the nineteenth century. And so at a minimum, we are not still in an equal like, things have gotten better with respect to private governance. And so on the one hand, I'm saying if this if public or decentralized governance decentralized governance is so efficient, why haven't capitalists done it previously? I suspect that they would simply due to self interest alone. And also my contention is things have gotten better over the last two centuries with respect to access to the private organizational forms that used to require an affirmative act of the legislature for you to ever incorporate with limited liability. That's no longer the case. And so if you talk to organizational scholars, they're like, this is one of the most this is the most liberal point in history for access to private organizational forms. They don't talk about democratizing those private organizational forms. They say anyone should be able to access that form and create an organization if they want. If you buy that narrative, that means a lot of people are voluntarily choosing a more centralized form of governance. My contention is, is this hinges on the purpose of an organization. So can't we all just get along? My and this is I spend two sections of my paper discussing this relatively it it this platitudinal insight, if you wanna even call it an insight, which is for an organization, unanimity is the ideal. And I talk about how anytime you join an organization, there are going to be losses. What do I mean by that? At some point, what you have to do for that organization will not be what you want to do. The employee doesn't want to work every hour they're contracted for. That's the classic agency cost. But more importantly, for any organization, I would contend that you will not agree with every action of that organization and every decision of that organization in the future. So joining an organization means a significant set of costs that due to you voluntarily joining an organization are exceeded by the expected benefits resultant from the collective action purpose of that particular organization. But I'm talking about an ideal world here, which is ideally, I would join any organization that I know ex ante will perfectly reflect reflect my preferences in every future moment. That's the ideal. Think about it from the perspective of any organization member. Ideally, they would know at every moment that they're in perfect agreement with the organization. Does this sound crazy? It should. I'm talking about an unattainable ideal for collective action. This is equivalent for anyone who is a fan of Ronald Coase. This is an equivalent form of argumentation to a zero transaction cost world as argued for by Ronald Coase. Not that he thought that world could exist, but he said we can learn a lot about the world that does exist with transaction costs by under by thinking through what one without transaction costs would look like. In the paper, I argue that all of these results fall out of a world of zero exit cost, where you are at every moment in perfect agreement with your organization's actions. To me, every collective action and decision is consistent with every organization member's preferences. There are no representative losses whatsoever due to organization membership. This does this this is directly consonant with zero exit costs. I can, at any moment, say, I don't like this organization. I'm gonna plug into another organization, and I have infinite choice and zero cost of considering the the new organizations and zero cost of moving to those new organizations. That's zero exit cost. And, again, this should sound crazy because this world doesn't exist, but I think it reveals important things about the nature of collective action in practice. And so I'm right now, I'm painting one end of a continuum of exit costs that every organization poses for its members. And my second move is those exit costs fundamentally derive from the organization's chosen purpose. And so this would entail infinite organizational choice, and all membership at all moments would be perfectly voluntary. If I can just hit a button and be in another organization that better suits my preferences, that's zero exit costs. But it's always costly to switch our organizations. In this stylized example, there's no need to formally organize. Because why do we formally organize? We tend to define people who can take special action on the part of a group. We define people who can take defined rules for the group. But most of the reasons for governance apparatus writ large, as I understand it, is not to coordinate action that everyone already agrees about because by definition, that action would occur spontaneously. It is the elements of collective action that result in disagreement among members that are the lifeblood of governance. And so costless exit in this model means any empowered authority must countenance org members' preferences perfectly. Because if they don't, that member leaves immediately. So a world of zero exit costs is like pure democracy. Because even if you centralize collective decision making authority, if they know you can leave costlessly at the push of a button, they have to perfectly countenance your preferences in every decision. This should sound like crazy town, because it doesn't exist. So why am I talking about a world that doesn't exist? To shed light on one that does. Exit costs vary significantly depending on the organization in question. Is it more costly to change your employer or become a citizen of another country? I would argue typically the latter. Is it more costly to change your grocery store or move to another state? I would argue the latter. And so, as the scope of an organization comes to dominate an entire field, exit costs increase drastically for individual members of that organization. At some point, that membership doesn't even really become voluntary for public organizations such as the one you happen to be born into as a citizen. That's really high exit costs. So monopoly provision of collective goods is the other endpoint of the spectrum of exit costs, where it's almost infinite for many people if they cannot exit at all. And I would contend that most citizens of most nations do not have the freedom to migrate, or if they do, that's a really, really, really high exit cost compared to the other end of the continuum where exit costs are zero. So the quote that kind of for me emphasizes is it's the only game in town. Take it or leave it. That's the power of the monopolist. That is saying, yeah. If you don't like my terms, good luck finding another good such as this because I'm the only one producing it. That is the antithesis of the world where the governor of an organization says, anyone can exit at any time, and I need enough of these people voluntarily here to achieve our collective purpose. And so I'm setting up a continuum of exit costs as a function of an organization's chosen purpose. Because an organization's chosen purpose tends to dictate the extent of other organizations engaged in the same or similar activities. There is by and large not competitive jurisdiction in the same area within The United States for public governance. And so that's an organization, public government, whose purpose means they're a monopolist. That means exit costs are as high as they are likely to be for our collective organizations. So this is all to say, purpose is greatly defines exit costs. I don't wanna reach the stronger claim, which is exit costs are perfectly derivative of an organization's purpose. There may be more going on. But I would I would contend that an organization's purpose defines the level of competitive activity among other organizations providing the same or similar outputs. That is in great part an input to the exit costs that individual members of an organization face. So as exit costs increase, the greater the concern on the part of any group member about the abuse of concentration of authority. The greater the exit cost, the less any group member can be assured that their preferences will be considered by those uniquely empowered to govern. Here's a sidebar that's another unpopular comment in, cryptocurrency communities. Governance at impersonal scale, to me inevitably involves some measure of concentration of authority. Representative decision making or delegated decision making is ubiquitous in impersonal organizations at scale. Have a few people make decisions on behalf of the larger whole because polling everyone is too costly. This is emergent in blockchain networks. Delegated proof of stake, anyone? Ring any bells? And so for me, the act of representative decision making within our collective action organizations is inevitable. Think of con congresspeople. Think of your state legislatures. You name the organization, and I provided it's an impersonal organization, not a family or one where everyone knows one another. You name the impersonal organization, and I'll probably show you some measure of representative decision making occurring on behalf of the larger whole. Similarly, though, you need to articulate rules for an organization. Who does that? Sometimes, maybe it's the entire will of the organization, but does the entire organization then implement or enforce those rules upon the collective? More often, you identify specially empowered individuals or it it it within a particular organization to be your enforcers, to be your executive branch as it's called in public governance. And so for me, collective action at scale necessarily entails concentration of authority. But the more that your exit costs increase as an individual member, the more you should rightly be concerned about where are my preferences, or to put it more bluntly, where are my rights as against the decisions of the greater collective. And so, in an ideal world, you don't need any any constraints on your governors because they're perfectly constrained by your ability to exit at any time. But as your exit costs increase, you need a second best solution which is ubiquitous in our systems of ordering, which is constitutional constraints, as I call them. And so, these involve selection of the governors, retention of the governors, punishment of the governors. That's all how do we choose our representative decision makers, How do we retain them if they're not appointed for life? And how do we discipline them given that they're specially empowered within our group? The second and democracy is central to these. It should be apparent. I meant to put in parentheses after selection. Democracy is one of the quintessential examples of this. The other vector that I break out in the paper is what I call constraints on the substance and process of collective action. Congress cannot legislate a death warrant for someone. They that doesn't their collective authority doesn't reach to them being able to say this individual needs to die tomorrow. Go ahead and do that executive branch. That's a violation of the bill of rights. So there are substantive constraints on what a collective action process can even decide on as against the individual members of the group. That's the bill of rights. But as importantly, there are procedural constraints and a belief that these constraints will be adhered to. That's due process under the US constitution. And so my contention is that these constitutional constraints become more important for beneficially ordering groups the more exit costs for group members increase. But the lower exit costs are, the more individual employees of firms can exit and go to other firms, the more then that constitutional constraints are a second best that isn't necessary to preserve the autonomy of the individual as against the action of the group or the organization in question. I do reach this in the conclusion, which is if exit costs are never zero, though, my analysis suggests that some measure of these constitutional constraints that I've enumerated are always optimal for our collective action organizations at impersonal scale. So this is ultimately an argument for we need some constraints on on use of authority, but depending on the purpose of the organization, those might be pretty minimal. But if the purpose of the organization is to govern indefinitely over all questions arising from the interaction of people within a particular geographic region, exit costs are incredibly high there. That means constitutional constraints are necessary to fully achieve that organization's purpose because it becomes closer to a voluntary position on the part of individual members. It's not voluntary. I'm not making that argument. I'm just saying constitutional constraints approximate the individual representativeness that exit necessarily entails. Your action is representative when you say I'm exiting this organization for this one that I prefer. Constitutional constraints approximate that level of representativity when exit when that level of representative exit is increasingly costly, if not impossible. So final slide. This is this then results in the institutional power law as I've described it, which is derivative of an organization's purpose. So the chosen joint output of collective action that the organization is pursuing, derivative of that purpose is necessarily a level of exit cost because of the level of competition or not in the provenance of that purpose. And so derivative of those that level of exit costs is an optimal level of constitutional constraints to achieve that organization's intended purpose. That is my articulation of an institutional power law. Although as I've said, there's some scholars of complexity theory who are like, that's not a power law, and others who are like, that that sounds like the closest to that you're gonna get in the soft world of institutional design. So I'll end there, and I definitely there's been quite a bit of activity in the chat that I have been ripping past in the interest of getting all my content out roughly in the period of time allotted to me.

So what you're describing of optimizing for, that's what I use as organization's chosen purpose. And so to me, lumping all private organizations into your for all revenue maximizing or profit maximizing private organizations into one bucket isn't right here. I would say there's many sub buckets that are relevant to consider because those define the other organizations that members of that given organization can exit to at some cost. That cost is never zero, but, arguably, it's much lower in many con organizational context than others. And so it it it optimizing for is a great shorthand for it it it for the chosen purpose. To use your language, I would say that it it the prevalence of concentrated decision making in context where exit costs are sufficiently low, to me, indicates that more centralized governance is better for optimizing that organization's chosen purpose. I'm very agnostic though about whether we should be choosing these purposes for our organizations. This is not a normative argument saying, like, all profit seeking is the right way to go for those organizations pursuing those purposes. No. It's more saying that, like, from the perspective of an individual, they associate with different organizations as a function of that organization's purpose. That defines the set of alternative organizations that they can opt into with some exit costs. But the more those exit costs increase, the more it's a case of, like, it's fictitious to me to be like, oh, you don't like The US. Why don't you just move to Canada? It's like, it it it that narrative has never had purchased for me in part because I it it most people can't afford to do that. And so the reality is is that they're constrained in ways that make me very concerned for their rights within the system as a function of the inevitable concentration of authority that collective action decision making at scale entails. Does that does that clarify?

think under

Sure. I think, Eric, I'm having heard your conclusion now. I think I better understand what what you're getting at. So, yeah, my question is is not as important. I mean, I think I think I was a little confused because I didn't see an equation, and that that was just getting me thrown for a loop. But I think I see it in a there could be some equation you would write down where you're just saying that, if I understand right, that as proportionate to an organization's exit cost, in in some proportion to that, there has to be as that increases and also an increase in constitutional constraints. And it may not be, like, a direct proportion. It might be, like, proportionate to the square or proportionate to the the cube or something. So that's that's all you need to say, but it's

I would be doing cartwheels if I could define the functional form for this power law. Like, I it it it in the sense that this is a complex enough system that I feel like I'm stretching the claim I've identified a power law, like, let alone the actual functional form it takes. Does that

somewhere. There in in the functional form the functional form seems, like, easy enough to write down sort of, except, you know, we don't know what the constants are. And don't even know, like, how one would calculate, you know, this this notion of exit costs. That's hard to calculate. And the degree of constraint, all systems are to so if we could define what those things are as quantities, then sure. I think the form is is there, and then what's the exponent? I don't know. So that that was more my question. Like, you're why are you saying it's a power law? Do you that you have something to say about what that exponent is or or something? But, anyway, I'll I think that's we can rest it here.

No. Totally agree. And to me, the problem is even deeper than the set of parameters Blake would like to identify. Some of those, I think, could be identified especially in a relative sense. Where I really struggle though is if we're talking about all human organizations, how do I define buckets of purpose? I've I've deliberately chosen ones that it's very easy for us to compare for the purposes of analytical artifice, public government in The United States, a grocery store. But, like, in some sense, you need to define purpose at least vis a vis the the equation, the the weak equation with a lot of words in it that appeared on the last slide. And so to me, there are some deep problems in terms of reliably estimating this at all, But my contention is is that this ordered relationship is important because it helps us understand the specific institutional structure that is likely to be observed within a given set of organizations pursuing the same purpose.

Remind me which comment.

I was just interested in the perhaps it's a Nash equilibrium in answer to your question or why don't owners of organizations instill democratic process, that Nash equilibrium being that actually right now they're quite happy privatizing the profits and how could we possibly presuppose that democratic process would continue to be happy with the narrow privatization of profit.

So my like and this may involve you clarifying your statement. But for me, a Nash equilibrium is one where the participants that could choose a different equilibrium don't because this is the best equilibrium as a function of others' choices.

So one At least in the immediate

future. And so one possibility, although I struggle to understand how in competitive markets this condition would obtain, but would be that you cannot profit or it it you cannot you cannot compete unless everyone else to or a sufficient proportion of your competing organizations also chose Democratic. I'm being extreme, but hopefully it's clear what I mean. But to me, implicit in a lot of people's calls for democratic governance of our collective action organizations that are private, because we've got a we've got a healthy degree or some measure of democracy depending on your stance in our public organizations, But the people who call for it in the case of private organizations, I I see at least implicit is we will do better with this, or at a minimum, we will do no worse, but better ethical and equity considerations will be satisfied if we proceed under this under this. I'm a little bit I don't have as clean of an answer if it's like we can do no better. We just get a better redistribution of the gains from our collective action. I don't have a clean answer on the stickiness, although I would point to Nathan and I's discussion on Sunday about the ability of private organizations to entrench their preferred institutional form in legislation. So it's very hard for community organ or, like, community ownership or employee ownership in certain contexts because that's construed as a securities issuance under certain aspects of US law. And so I'm sympathetic I'm very sympathetic to nation's points because I'm about to present three papers at the public choice society meetings. So I'm deeply sympathetic to the critiques of public choice of our democratic system. But unless you're saying the entirety like, this entire equilibrium is the fat cats with their hands around it just clutching. To me, though, if they're competing with one another and they are for output in not all industries, but many industries, and you and you suggest that democratic ordering in pursuit of that collective output is more efficient, that doesn't seem like a Nash equilibrium to me because they can capture all of the gains from more efficient democratic production as compared to their centralized competitors. And so in that sense, it it but I'll let you cut in.

Sorry. I didn't mean to stop you in in flow there, but I was just reminded that Z also invited me to talk to the socio sociocracy comment I I left. I had a few years for my sins working in org design management consultancy. And one thing that I think is almost universally agreed amongst org designers is that democratic organization doesn't work for for for for a shorthand way of putting it. And the the closest that we can get to the ideals of democracy is a a sociocratic form, which has emerged since the 1960s, and emphasizes operation by consent. Effectively, you can't make all decisions democratically in an organization because even with the wonderful digitalization that that we can invoke these days, it just doesn't scale. And so actually what you do want is people on the front line with a feel for the decisions that need to be made to have the opportunity to discuss amongst their smaller cohort in that instance, democratically as a circle, as a to use sociocratic terminology and have the consent of the majority who aren't in that circle to make decisions and crack on. So there is, I think sociocracy is the closest to democracy in organizations that we have to date. And then there are variations like the trademarked approach called holacracy, which was very much informed by by by sociocracy.

I've read a good bit about holacracy, and accordingly, that's why sociocracy is is familiar to me. At some point, if it looks a heck of a lot more like majority input to some level of concentrated decisions, I would say that's a step away from centralization and a step towards democracy. Although it was music to my ears you saying, like, democracy has some efficiency problems. That's precisely what I'm arguing is is that it's it's given certain purposes, it's not competitively efficient to organize dem democratically. The question the very interesting question that I see this group on the bleeding edge of is which set of purposes can now be organized more democratically even if it's if it's more appropriately named a sociocracy. I would still argue that a sociocracy is more democratically organized than, say, a a a a privately held firm in The United States, and so it not publicly traded, to be clear. And so it it I think I think I'm in agreement in the sense that at the level of analysis I'm describing, democracy is kind I'm using it almost synonymously with decentralization. More autonomy resides with the individual compared to everything being centralized.

And and there's a there's an agglomeration to sociocracy, which you see in many different forms of complex adaptive system, which is very natural emergence. And I think that agglomeration and power laws are not strangers. I believe that there's a connection there that you might want to explore more deeply, But that extends beyond my knowledge on on on the matter.

I see them as both relevant, but I do think you and I defer greatly as to the extent to which the private organizational locus is the one that should deal with stakeholder concerns, as opposed to people who have a formal contractual relationship with a particular organization. I don't mean to belittle harms to stakeholders resulting from pursuit of a profit seeking company's objectives. Those are serious. To me, that's the domain of law and regulation. That is to me the purpose of public governance, which is it it deals with the negative effects on people who are not party to a private organization. And so needing to embed those within an organizational structure, the membership of which stakeholders lack, that is where I I do see problems with stakeholder theory in terms of achieving its objectives even though I agree with those objectives in a lot of instances. To me, that's the domain of law, so that group, in my mind, should be better enfranchised through the public governance system to restrain the private actor as opposed to trying to restrain the private actor by saying, I'm a stakeholder even though I don't have any formal like, I can't do anything within your organization. And so I limit this analysis to be like, this is it's members of an organization who are contracted in or are citizens or otherwise explicitly delineated as you are a member and these are your rights. Does that it it does that

And obligations. Yeah. It it it fair. Fair. I often shorthand that that way, but very fair point, Thomas. Nathan, does that I don't feel like that's quite getting at your question, though. Well, I I think

Awesome. And and when am I not concerned about the franchise of group members? When exit costs are zero. But the more exit costs increase, the more I am concerned about the ability of members of a group to voice their concerns as against the relatively centralized and empowered action of the collective whole.

Hello. Yeah. I mean, I guess, for me, like, I feel like you were we were talking about voice without saying the word as much. Maybe I missed it. There was, like, the the way that democracy doesn't scale in the same ways and, like, these sorts of things. And that that to me is around what are the actual almost like, what's the order of growth complexity around voice? What what are the what are those power laws? And so I think that that came to mind. And I think one thing that's really interesting is that, of course, we developed democratic structures that deal with that problem through representation and now through deliberate of many publics. And so, like, one of the things that I've been exploring has been, is there a way to use the form of, like, liberty many publics, which, like, address some of the issues around this the if you have a lot of organizations because the nice thing about territories, you can only be in one at a time. And I think that's one of the things that lends it lends it particularly well to, things that actually have a pretty high voice cost for any individual. And so so the question is, can you do something like that where you're in a thousand organizations at the same time? And maybe this is another sort of angle on this is like, how many organizations can you be a part of? Because unlike a territory, you can be in more than one. And so the the impact of increasing voice costs become very, very significant. And so that's where like, okay, are there ways to deal with that? And then does that help address some of the problems that you raise here?

I think that there's Oh, yeah.

Okay. And and Thomas mentioned that you can be in more than one because there's different levels of hierarchy. And that is that is true, but it's still a lot less.

No. And and I see Thomas's point as the important asterisk of polycentricity lurking over this entire thing I'm describing. It's like the state government is nested. This could they they're all nested. Nonetheless, I would contend that individuals have choice between many, but not all of the organizations in which they reside. I'm conflating voice and loyalty in Hirschman's analysis fully here. I'm saying if you're a member, you have a set of options available to you or you don't depending on the level of constitutional constraints present in your organization. But one of the constitutional constraints that I consider to be so important that it was in this relatively short article at the level of analysis, which is, like, I would say, a 100,000 foot level, not even 10,000 foot level, is selection and retention of your specially empowered group members who are making decisions on behalf of the larger collective. To me, the only way you can maximize the representativeness or the law minimize the losses to autonomy that a group may pose is by providing more input into the selection and retention of governors within your system. By governors, I mean legislators, executives, it it judges, etcetera. So anyone who has special power to define, implement, or adjudicate rules or disputes within the organization, to me, the higher the exit cost, the more that ideally that that that process should be governed by voice of members, the franchise as Nathan was calling. And so your second point, I think that there's some kind of just natural upper limit on the number of organizations that we can conceivably have voice in. That's attention costs. And so even if we get the best possible technology for reducing attention costs, at some point, there are more organizational options out there that I would like to play in than I can have voice in. What do I mean by that? My retirement is parked atomistically in many, many, many different funds, many different companies, government debt instruments. I cannot possibly govern all of those myself, yet the benefits of risk diversification associated with where my retirement is parked exceed the losses associated with voice. And so I and and you might you might contest that, but I it it I do think that there are potentially reasons you want to associate that that are beneficial to a to the point where the loss is associated with your not having voice because you're a member of 10,000 organizations in an atomistic sense. I think the benefits my benefits exceed my cost to voice associated with my parking my retirement in a way that's much more risk diversified than it would be if it was parked in a set of organizations that I could meaningfully have voice.

Yeah. I mean, I think I agree to a large extent, and I would have a 100% agreed. But I think the creation of deliberative mini publics and that approach to voice may actually address some of those concerns. And I'm curious to see where that goes.