Thank you very much, Nathan. Hello, everyone. So I will share my screen. So I'm Antoine. I'm working at Nissan Pubic as you said, Nathan. And I will start, I think, with the word on on me so that that's the last slide I I did as a presentation. This is the timeline and you have the the timeline on on the the political deliberative part and the the timeline on the the more the blockchain and crypto side so in 1988 that's covered the text, proposing to randomly select the member of the Parliament's instead of electing them with a couple of reasons why that should be a better solution but I will come back to that and that was for me the first time I said wow okay that's that's something I want to work on that. So I worked on it and wrote a PhD on random selection politics and until 2011 and then started to work for Mission Pubic where we work on designing and implementing processes of deliberative democracy. The other side of the mirror of my life is that I started to mine some Bitcoin in 2011. Not much, a bit, but then I I switched to Boink and Citi because I I thought it's much more it's much better for humanity and for science, and I dropped it and then I came back to crypto in 2017 as I discovered Ethereum and since then I'm engaged in many crypto communities and projects and interested in it. And there is something that connects the both of them and it's an issue that has been in my practice and thinking is what is, so maybe I start with that. The question is what is a relevant high quality tool for decision making in the twenty first century? And that's the key question, that's my passion. I try to find ways to design those processes and to implement them. And it's because there is a, behind that, there is an issue and the issue is that when you have a river and you want to cross it, you have a problem, you need a bridge. And the bridge you build is dependent on the context in which you are. So in the Roman empire time, what you would need was stone and slaves and you would need an architect. In the Middle Ages you would need some wood, peasants and architects. In the nineteenth century you would switch to steel workers, many architects and engineers. In the twentieth century you need, as you said, steel workers, architects, engineers but also a citizen consultation and maybe an environmental impact study. And my question is tomorrow in the twenty first century, what is the, what we need to build that bridge when we have to cross a river. And that's the key question for me and that I will try to present in hypothesis. My hypothesis is that a mix of blockchain governance and you see I put it in brackets because it's a very of course broad topic, deliberative governance and adaetonian governance could do the trick. On the first one, the blockchain governance, I'm more interested. On deliberative and adytonian governance I'm more professional and an expert. So for the first one, you will see that many things I may say in the coming minutes will may seem for to you to be already resolved or naive, but I think the my idea is to to confront that and try to understand and who who that can be bridged, who that mix, and if that mix can be one answer to that question. And so then you tell me, okay, that's a bit surrealistic. It's a kind of a nonsense to to try to find that solution to governance and decision making. It's kind of DADA and I will answer, that's the trick. No, it's not DADA, it's DADAO. DADAO meaning deliberative aleatorian, decentralized, autonomous organization. And that's the model I want to propose and present today. To do that, I would start by having a word on what is decision making so coming back to the basics and how to assess existing processes. And why do deliberative and adiatory and endows have the potential to deliver high level or high quality decision making, what it could look like and then what could be done as a research and action agenda. Basically decision making and I will not probably learn anything from you on that is the classical who gets what, when, how and why. On the what classical definition is lots functions and decisions. So a lot being an item, a bike picture car functions being something that you do, being a judge being a jury being a CEO being something, and a decision is a course of action so am I going to go right or left. Are we going to spend more or less? That kind of decisions. That's the what. And for the when and who, classical distinction here too is that this is the whole is a procedure of selection. So it's moving from many options to one, reducing the set of options we have. And for that, we have four possibilities. We have the vote the market, the examination and random selection. And each of them work with a different tool for doing that reduction. In the case of the votes, the reduction is done through the aggregation of preferences which is done through the suffrages plus an algorithm. An algorithm can be majority vote, simple majority, weighted majority, so that's the algorithm. In the case of the market, the equilibrium is found through the confrontation of preferences through the price and then you find you reduce the set of options to one. In the case of examination, we take criteria that can be, I don't know, merit or birth or age or gender so you have a fixed list of criteria and you examine if you fulfill that criteria and then you reduce the set of options. And in the case of random selection, you have a moment of alliatry moment, so random moment. Now then if you think about the why in the decision making, the why is as I said before, it can be why we use such a process. For example, it's often said that the market process is efficient. It's often said that the vote or process on election process is transparent and that criteria could be based on the merits so that's the way we want to use such a process. But the why is also who we think about the process, and there are three big ways of thinking about a decision making process it's a. The first one is a finalist saying there is an overarching force, there is something, someone in charge of taking the decision so what you see on the picture is the Goddess Fortuna from the Greek. You can also interpret the results of a decision making process as being deterministic so the consequence of a cause, a cause and consequences or you can interpret it as being probabilistic so following the bell curve as probability shows us. So that's in a way decision making and I will come back to it of course after. Now how to assess existing processes. I have differentiated between the macro level and the micro level. At the macro level I use the fitted framework and you can see it's a very very very precise framework and for the micro level the quality of quetane. So what is the fitted framework? It's a kind of fuzzy inductive but also deductive empirical and theoretical typology. What it means is that I worked with ideal tips based on real cases, but also some theoretical one, and it's a typology. It should help us categorize and understand the kind of decision making processes we have to deal with nowadays. So it's a tool for analysis and it's not formally perfect, far from it, but it will make the job. I take as a basis the classical Aristotelian division of who is governing and for whom and you have the one, the few and the many. So it's a double entry table. Is one governing for one, for example, or is one governing for some or few or is one governing for many or all? And as you see for the some and few, I reentered the distinction of who these few are. And those few selected by votes, by market, by an examination or by random selection. Alright. And now here's a trial of putting some examples. So for example, if we consider that we have one governing for one it can be called despotism so it's a kind of ideal type. If one is governing for the benefit of some or few based on vote voting system it easily classified as clientelism and if it's based on market forces and money, it can be called nepotism. So you see that kind of classification. What is interesting I think for today and those categories and those categories are here, the DAO. And the DAO meaning that many or all are governing for some, some few based on market process. So that's more or less my assessment of many DAOs today. Also in yellow, that is a topic, a subject in crypto governance, the question of the benevolent dictator, meaning one governing for many, for all of the classical figure of the populist. What is interesting for me also in the crypto space, I have the impression that one case or ideal tip could be the sum based on the market, so people with token, people with money wanting to govern for the many and that's all the topic around the narrative, we are all going to make it, the question of decentralization, Web3, the bankless movement, so all that being a category which I think is interesting for our analysis today. And then two more which are sortation and democracy. So sortation is a case in which some randomly selected people govern for the benefit of everyone and democracy all for all. So that's the yellow one, the most interesting for me in what I am presenting today and the model I will present afterwards. Now, if we do not take the global macro level but if we focus on the macro level, we can assess a process of decision making with a series of criteria which are inclusion, deliberation, relevance and fairness. Inclusion means that the right persons are included and deliberation that there is a discussion of high quality and relevance that the process is fit for purpose and fairness that the process is of course fair. And then on the right side you have some more concrete criteria, and meaning that for example you can differentiate between quantitative inclusion so how many people are included versus a qualitative inclusion. Are every voices, every different diversity of voices included in the process? And is the process interesting? What are the incentives? So you'll see on the right side the sub criteria. Now if we play the game to assess different models and being for example a DAO, a mini public or climate governance and this is more or less again a fuzzy, very intuitive, inductive classification. This is what we have. What we can see is for example that in the case of DAOs we have an inclusion which is quite limited in terms of quantity and quality but a good structure for incentives. If we take the climate governance, we see that we have many negotiators and not many of them and that those people are professionals paid by their government as a daily job. With that we can assess the quality of decision making process and try to see which one has a potential to solve our issues for the twenty first century, so the bridge of the twenty first century or those that are and have flows in that direction. Okay, let's see. Okay, so the goal is now, if we come back to the first table and the second table is to have a decision making process that is from all for all and with high quality. And for me, this

Yeah. I can't hear him either.

Is it better now?

it's better. Okay. So maybe, indeed, it's because of the movie. We'll try again to to show it, and we will see if it works. Does it work now?

Okay. So on the left side is indeed the deliberative process that we've been running as mister Publique two years ago. So it's a deliberative path. And on the right side, you may have recognized it. It's the constitution DAO and the the power of such a DAO and it's the the potential it has. On the left side, I give you a very short, not overview, but idea of how we could can look like when we do that, if it works.

It's here. Sorry. Maybe I need to sorry for that. Here. Okay. Okay. Okay. I don't need to share much more. It's just a process we did in 2020 in more than 70 countries of the world with randomly selected citizens talking about the future of the Internet. And that's the more deliberative part and how it can look like. Let's see. Okay. So now back to my first hypothesis, the question of the data. It's a mix, as I said, it's a mix of deliberative, aleatorian and decentralized autonomous organization. And what are so now I I go back a bit to the more organizational testing phase, pilot phase. What are the kind of decisions that such an organization has to take? First one is the constitution or dissolution of the organization. And second, questions of membership, inclusion and exclusion. And then the question of function sharing. As I said in the beginning, function can be political or non political and budgetary questions. So if we take a classical organization or DAOs making budget, invest, share revenue, lever taxes. So, and then again, you will see that I love tables. I really put, excuse me, I repeat, put the question of the base layer, being the vote, the market, the criteria, examination or CLAROS, the random selection with the ideal tips of my typology from before. So democratic vote and decentralized end markets, deliberative based on criteria or personal deliberation of democracy with random selection. And then I also tried to understand, okay, what can be the processes that fit those use cases. So for example, if we if we take the membership, we could imagine a DAO having a vote of existing members on getting new members on board and would be that would be a use case of a democratic vote in the membership in the organization. And you could also, for example, imagine you should take the membership to the right with a random selection that you could airdrop tokens to all addresses. That would be a very democratic random selection. Or you could imagine to have a airdrop of tokens to a representative set of addresses, and that could be, for example, a more aleatorian use case of random selection. So that's the the kind of trying to concretize the the principle of what could be the data. And at the end, down the path, I much like this picture, picturing a future, a very far future, where DAOs and DandaOs could be the the standard and that could bring us to that direction. Now, back to today is what is the research and action agenda is of course present and discuss the idea and get constructive critic. And on that, of course, it's the first time I present that set of ideas as it is. So you are the the first one to to hear that that thinking. So So I'm very happy to to confront it to to a critic and to a knowledge, of course, on governance that you will have. And then for me, the the next point is to go on refining the model and the typologies, of course, confront them to existing governance, principal governance systems that we can see in on chain or in different blockchain projects. But also thanks to literature and the knowledge on governance that you have that many other have. I also think that it could be interesting to find a DAO that would like to test the data model and and understand how it could be implemented. And, of course, all that could be done by trying to understand who would like to join forces to apply for research grant or grant in the crypto space to finance all that research. As a wrap up, I think current governance systems are not up to the task for the twenty first century. I think that deliberative, a libertarian democracy has a strong potential because it's a mix of collective intelligence, long term vision, legitimacy, very strong legitimacy, a very strong trust and efficiency, but also the DAOs and the crypto balance has a strong potential in terms of scale. Of course, that deliberative system do not have at the moment, trustless systems, question of enforcement, which is much stronger than in deliberative systems. Question of incentives is is much stronger in the DAO and the global bridge. So for me, bringing them together can help build a solution, which is neither crypto or techno naive nor unscalable. And I think that's it. Thank you.

I said, it's the first time I test that, that bunch of ideas.

And, Nathan, what's the the practice? Do do you share? Do you gather questions? Or

Okay. So I think, Eric, it's that's that's one of the I mean, that's I turn it positive. I turn it positive in saying, actually, we need both. We need a good combination of immutability and deliberation and the the full exercise in the fifty years to come would be to find that balance. And if we think about, institutional design and institutional practice, I think it takes time to to to learn from the the right balance. And and my feeling is that what we see now is, is is the the infancy of it. When you have a community being, completely, overwhelmed by a a non chain decision wanting to go back, And then others saying no, but it's code is low, so it's it's immutable. So that's it. And there is no waveform at the moment, or there is no concern. There is no full back process to say, okay. So let's do that. And I think one of the the key for the yes to commit to understand what is this? What, what what is a good practice, that the communities can refer to when you have that kind of problem?

with it. So

Very good. Very good. Thank you, Joshua. So I am thank you very much. It's you know, that's like random selection. Random selection politics has been invented and reinvented 10 times. So I like when you said it already exists. It's it's that's because that's the moment. So it's it's fantastic news. I I'd love to to follow-up on that. I had the chance in the in the past months to facilitate the creation of a a DAO, and I used I proposed to use a future search workshop. So it's a three day deliberative process with which helps to build a vision and prepare an action plan for an organization. And that worked very well, so I'm I'm happy to to connect. Very good. Thank you.

Hi, Antoine. Thanks for the presentation. So I'm curious. I have kind of two two questions here. One is just a a general ask maybe to contextualize this kind of the DAO form of governance for particular use spheres. Josh, I think, was just mentioning one that maybe is, like, you know, kind of a roving investment fund, it sounds like, or or something that that could be that. And so, you know, thinking about not only context as a way to help us understand what the challenges and demands might be for this model in a more grounded way, but also thinking specifically in terms of the dimension of, enforceability of the decision making process. And I was thinking as you presented the the beautiful table of of different forms of governance from from and for also of, Arc and Fung's power cube, which, right, has this additional dimension of the the way that the decisions that have been reached through a deliberative process become operationalized. And it seems to me like if we start to talk about particular use cases, we'll see the point at which we have to move from on chain to IRL. And that seems to be a consistent structural point of weakness or at least a challenge and the the opening point for other less intentionally designed forms of governance to to insert themselves into these processes. So, yeah, curious about how you might understand that dimension in in particular contexts.

Yeah.

I can I'll I'll post a link to that that article, Aviv.

Yep. So I think, indeed, that's for me, that's the the not the weak point, but the the question is how do we ensure to raise the quality of the nonimmutable part? Because for now, it's when when when we have the the on chain part, it's okay. It's it's clear. It's easy. But where we have a problem is when decisions are prepared and made on on on on Discord forums and threads and telegrams and and and with a lot of, polarization, going on. So is who do we help the the group, to to hire the quality deliberative quality of the decision making and create an interface from on chain of chain that that is a better alternative. And for me, the the other thing is, who do we long term help deliberative processes to be more enforceable and have a stronger potential for enforcement when they are done. Because many times, those those deliberative processes are useful to to find good solutions and take good decisions, but then you need to enforce them. So for me, the the question is really that interaction between the two spheres and how do we do we find an equilibrium? And I think it's not easy and it's it's as I said before, it's for me, it's more mid term, long term story. And then on your other question on the on the scale, I have a kind of intuition that it could be useful for large scale decision making processes, also political, but that's also down the road. And the beginning should be more or will be probably on DAOs as we know them for investment and and and maybe around money, around art, around things like that. And maybe when they have proven to be something, extend to other pieces. So I but I could also imagine a city wanting to to take a decision which which such a a mix. And because if you imagine that at the end of a brick. More democratic referendum so vote based brick to for a participatory budgeting, for example, that could be an interesting thing because it's also about money and that could be a a model or use case or a pilot.

Thanks.

Excellent. Hello. One second. Let me actually move this Zoom into her. Yes. So I I guess I'm curious. Well, first of all, I saw Seth's questions, and I think that I just wanted to because I wanted to I was a little confused about that too and wanted to make sure. The aleatoric, is that just another synonym for for partition? It is? Okay. Good. Great.

So aleatoric is more the the principle on which is based, which is random selection. So you could imagine in an area to bring democracy or so to to distribute, for example, housing or social housing to random selection as part of. Right. Yeah. So that's more of a broad I see.

It's a it's a generalization.

Yep. That's it.

Yeah. And and I'm I'm with Nathan on the on the if like, I think lottery, I guess, is the is the core there. Right? That at least people understand. But okay. The the actual question here for me is that I and and maybe this actually is actually similar to that's question number two. I'm not I'm not sure. But I feel like there's web three point o, and then there's whatever that is, and then there's, like, org org three point o. And I I've this I've just made this up in response to to this. And, like, let's say you this is a made up history, but you can imagine, like, org one point o or corporations one point o would be, like, the British East India Company, and these, like, chartered organizations, and all the problems that many of them had. And then you have two point o would be, like, the modern version where everyone the state lets you just make a corporation whenever you want. And then the three point o is this, like, non state based corporation. And, like and how do you and, like, the with their own sort of governance, it's sort of independent of that. Is this more about that part or the crypto part? Like, is is the cryptography component than the magic that that allows immutability? How important is the the the the the types of, like, things that you can do with that this sort of, you know, software magic, essentially, versus what the the fact that there's now maybe a nexus of power and money that's directed toward a new type of organizational form that maybe has less state control. And I ask that just to the context here is I'm thinking about this. Apologies people who've heard me mention this before, but I am trying to find a path to take our global platforms, technology platforms like Facebook, Google, Twitter, you know, etcetera, and bring them into a place where they're actually governed through means, like or or at least aspects of them are sliced off into sort of mini public style governance. And so I have this, you know, platform democracy proposal, and I think there's a lot of incentive alignment around why they actually want that for various policies. And so that and that to me, there's no crypto in that. There's just moving to a little bit them closer to this, like, org three point o model that I literally just made up on the fly. Apologies for anyone who's already made anything like this.

Okay. Thank you very much. I think that's with your questions, you you you you are in the the the non or the the I said the the dark places in the thinking and intuition. My intuition is there is something in that direction, merging, cryptographic, online, really immutable processes and deliberative processes because both have a lot of potential. Okay. So that's the the strong intuition. And now now the question is, okay, how do we make that work? And indeed, the the so if imagine down the road, the the one of the strongest for me, cryptographic part is the incentive part, is being able to have that that decentralized financial loop. So if you imagine that citizens are paid for being citizens or are rewarded for being citizens like you had in the Greek democracy, having one Ebola for one day on the citizens assembly. And that can be coupled to a digital identity, which is the non chain identity. There is something very strong because you have a a positive group. And there is another positive group, which is if you have a mini public deliberative mini public. So I saw the question was there. So what is a mini public is a a group of randomly selected citizens that take four days, six days, or a month to inform themselves and discuss on a topic and give recommendations at the end. And so if we have a if we imagine a many public with this, which is entitled with a treasury, imagine the power of that because they can have that collective intelligence process and at the end recommend something that can be put to a on chain vote and treasury can can be spent. So if you imagine those use cases, I think there are a couple where the combination of both is very, very powerful. And then on on Facebook and co, so we've been working with with Facebook in the dialogue on the future of the Internet. They are one of the members of the coalition. And since then, we proposed them to transform the Supervisory Board so that the Board on Content Moderation to be a randomly selected group of their users or of citizens. And the reception is not bad. So it's not done. But the the idea is has been has been discussed internally. We know that, and we are discussing with them on that.

Yeah. So is Yeah. Sorry.

Yeah. Thank you on on those questions. So I think for the the the first one on okay. Sorry. Can you repeat the the first one? I had the

So I'll go back to the the kind of distinction between the the different base layer, so and and narratives and and some kind of decisions. So if you think so so I could imagine if you want, but it's something you you need to design because random selection, you design it as you want it. And why do you design? Because you have a justification for it. So you could say, for example, one NFT, one vote, and and and one probability or one chance of being chosen. And or you could say, okay, one token. So you could have a weighted lottery from token holders. And And it's a bit what cleras.yo has. So you just take your your tokens and you have a weighted probability of being chosen. But then it's it's a kind of mix between a democratic and aristocratic or almost nepotip one because the more you stack, the more the probability you have to be chosen. You could again correct with a credit quadratic system where you say, okay, but it's the case. And and I think that the the in the sense of the design of the procedures, there is a an infinity of capacities. But for me, the the question is, are we aware that random selection is one of those processes that we can tap into when we design a selection mechanism for decision for decision body? So that's single the

Completely agree.

So, yeah, I just I guess, I'll just state my question as I wrote it. Let me scroll up. So we know we've we've got web two implementations of things, like, sort of, a a a illiatory democracy. Should I think, in moving this to web three, should I think of that as just, like, a a nice thing for this new space to have? Like, you're providing, you know, familiar tools to this new community, or should I think of it as solving a fundamental problem in a web two implementation?

I don't know. I don't know because and so my question is, who has been who has to learn most? And I think the deliberative crowd has a lot to learn from what's happening in the crypto world and be inspired on the kind of processes that can be used. As I said, in terms of scaling, incentives, but I can't say exactly what at the moment. So I'm sorry. I don't have a good answer for that.

Okay. Well, let's see. I wonder if I can still salvage the question. Okay. Well, we're talking about, like, a decentralized implementation. I don't know. Do you wanna game out a situation where a centralized you know, often the web three the defense for web three comes from a security perspective. So could we kinda gain out a a situation where a centralized implementation is vulnerable to tech or or abusing its power? I mean, you say legitimacy is is a fundamental use. Is there a maybe it would be a situation where there's legitimacy problem with a central I don't know. I'm just thinking that loud. Thanks for taking the question. If that job And then is great. Yeah.

No. But maybe yes. Maybe that's so I think in terms of gain, high security decentralized process may gain from the legitimacy of a deliberative in real life process because humans come together, discuss together and collectively assess the situation to propose a solution. And I think that that is that may strengthen instead of weaken the the security question, but that's a strong, that's a strong belief also in deliberation and and the value of saltation plus deliberation.

Thank you.

I mean, I I haven't read everything in the in the channel. So

And