Awesome. And welcome to Medigov seminar. Nathan, take it away.

Thank you, Nathan. Yes. So we're gonna give, like, a short overview of this book. For the sake of time, we're only gonna focus on three chapters, which we thought will be the one that will be the most interesting to the Metagov community. But, of course, the interesting thing is the discussion. So we will do, like, quite a quite a short presentation, and we will try to maximize the time for discussion. So yeah, so this book just came out. The idea was to kind of, like, create an overview in a very accessible way of, like, all the issues and questions and opportunities that is related to blockchain governance. And so to start, we want to start with an important distinction, which is one of the key chapter of the book, which basically compares and contrast between the conceptualization of blockchain technology as a trustless technology and, our proposal of actually looking at blockchain technology more as a confidence machine. And essentially, it comes from the general idea that, blockchain technology was created as a response of the erosion in trust in existing institution, in particular, financial institution, which has led to the attempt at creating a technology that will not require any trust anymore. And that could bypass those trusted authorities because everything can be verified and everything is marked into the blockchain. And so the chapter actually distinguished between two important con concept. One is the concept of trust and the other is the concept of confidence. And so trust is essentially this idea of, engaging into a particular relationship with particular person that we choose to trust. Even though we know that this person have the power to actually breach our trust and to actually act against our expectation, which therefore put us into a situation of vulnerability with regard to the person that we choose to trust, the person or the system. And, of course, trust can come from many different, facets. It can be just, like, a particular mood. It can be a particular psychological attitude. It can be based on, like, calculation and rational choice and so forth. And then we contrast this with the concept of confidence, which actually, does not come with any perception of risk or vulnerability, because it's actually based on an assurance from the perspective of the of the person that is confident that things will happen in a particular way. And so there is no need of trusting anything because we create expectations. And then based on our understanding of how the world works or based on repeated interaction, then we just assume that this is how things are. And so we don't need to question at any time, whether there is any risk that it might not happen that way. And so of course, trust and confidence are also feeding into each other in the sense that trust in a particular person or system is oftentimes based on the confidence that we have on external systems or on the trust that we have on external system. Right? So if I trust a doctor that is curing me, it can be either because either or both because I trust this person, because I created a relationship with that person, but also because I have confidence in the scientific, in the scientific world, because I have confidence in the, academic and licensing system and so forth. And so what, what we're trying to to propose into this chapter is that, we should actually look not just at blockchain as a trustless system, which doesn't make much sense to to to be honest, but rather as a system that is actually producing something and what it is producing is is confidence. And so when we look at the negative definition of blockchain is like trustless technology, which like which is mostly say, like, we don't need to trust because we can verify, because everything is recorded and there is, like, a pro provable, provable record of what has happened. But if we look at the positive definition, then we can see that blockchain actually can be regarded as a confidence machine. And basically, it is it is reducing the needs of trust because it is actually creating more assurance, creating more predictability. So that because of the higher degree of confidence that we have in the system, then we can interact with people that we don't trust because the amount of help that is required for the interaction is much lower. And so where does the confidence come from? It comes from mathematics and cryptography. So if we have confidence in the mathematics and, the cryptographic primitives, then we also have confidence that specific operation on the blockchain will operate according to a particular, framework. Then there is also, the economic incentives that happen so that if I trust or if I believe that the actors are actually acting in order to maximize their own utility function, then I can also have confidence that they will always operate in a particular manner, that will maintain, a predictability in the operation of the network. And then there is also all the expert system or, like, everything that comes from the transparency of a public verifiability, both of the source code that is deployed on the blockchain, but also of all the transaction and all the operations. And so altogether, those things are actually contributing to increasing the confidence in the system. And then, of course, because of this confidence, then we can create or we can it make it becomes easier to engage into trust relationship. Now, of course, the problem that we identify in the chapter is that, this confidence will be perfect if it was if blockchain were just a technical system. The problem is that blockchain are such a technical system, which actually, engage also social matters like humans. And this confidence, of course, is only there because we can trust the underlying operation of the network. And this brings us to importance of identifying where where is the trust coming? Where do we actually need to look at in order to like, even though we call them trustless system, there is always points of trust that are required in order for the confidence to be possible. And so one is the developers, the one that are actually producing the code and potentially deploying it on the blockchain. We have the maintainers of the network, which are miners in the case of Bitcoin, validators in the case of proof of stake, which are basically processing the transaction, which are building the blocks. And of course, they have some kind of power and counter powers between each other in order to decide which transaction should be processed and when. Then there is the end users, which have some degree of influence on the operation of the network, either because they have the power of, like, exiting if they are not happy with the way in which a particular system operates, but also because many of the systems actually provide governance abilities. So if I hold a particular amount of token, I might be able to influence the governance of the particular system that this token are associated with. And then we have like new intermediaries, which, the most obvious one are obviously the mining pools or the validation pools, which kind of like become this kind of aggregating power, where they start having a lot of influence on the operation of the network. But also there is those, super nodes which don't necessarily have, direct influence on the operation and the maintenance of the network, but, they have a lot of influence indirectly because, whether those are like the cryptocurrency exchange, the blockchain explorers, the custodian wallets, or just like merchants that are accepting blockchain transactions, then because they are a cluster of user, if they make a choice, for instance, if there is like a choice to be made between one fork of the blockchain to another, then the choice that they make will also be the choice of all the users of those of those platforms and of all the people that want to interact with the user of those platforms. So there is this kind of like indirect capacity to have a very strong influence on on the network. Then we have like the experts, which are usually either the founders of a project or the influencer that have that are the most vocal on the social media, which also can can shape the public opinion and therefore can also influence the way in which, the network will operate and evolve. And then, of course, even if sometimes we try to not think about them, there is a very important influence on the on the blockchain network, which are policymaker and regulators, which basically dictate what is legit and what is not legit. And indirectly, again, will, of course, have an influence on the way in which the system are designed, either because they want to escape regulation or because they want to comply with regulation. But nonetheless, they do have a strong impact. And so eventually when we think about, the blockchain governance systems, it is inherently a polycentric system. And so in order to to feel confident about the way in which the system operates, we cannot only and exclusively look at the technological layer of the network. We also need to consider the social layer and the influence that those two layers have with one another, as well as the external exogenous forces, which are governments and users. And eventually there is this kind of distributed consensus that emerge out of this within the shelling point. But there is no single actor that can dictate. And so in this case, there is confidence, but this confidence again comes from the fact that there is this polycentricity within the underlying governance framework. And, I'm gonna pass it to Marshad.

Great. Thank you. So in this, brief chapter in the book, there is a little bit of overlap with what, Primavera was saying in the sense that, we look at the challenges of regulating blockchain based systems using the lens of rule of law, rule by law, and introducing this idea of the rule of code and the rule by code. So as you know, the rule of law entails at a a thin conception that is that no one is above the law. And then there are sort of more richer and thicker notions of the rule of law in which we also see certain other aspects of a legal system that we sort of come to expect. So one is that there is an access to a legal remedy that the law must be, you know, clear and transparent, that it must not act, you know, retrospectively, but act prospectively. That just as a corollary to no one being above the law, everyone should be equal under the law and that, you know, whether you're a government or whether you're a citizen or whether you're a company, the law should apply to you equally. And then, of course, to enforce this law, you should have an independent judiciary that, again, applies this equally and fairly irrespective of the particular status of the person. But what we see in many jurisdictions and as we will come to argue, what we see online is that power and laws can be instrumentally used as a way of using and exercising political power. And there, you do not see any more a particular government being equally treated under the law, but they sort of stand above it and are able to use the law as a a way of sometimes punishing those who go against their interests. Now what we see with with cyberspace and taking this discussion to cyberspace is that you have this idea that that the Internet is the space that is somehow beyond the rule of law and is a unregularable space, and this was something that we know from the early Internet scholars. But once we start seeing the introduction of the large online platforms, whether it's, you know, Meta or whether it's, you know, Amazon or as we now see with x, we see that there is not only a relevance for legal systems, but that there is a particular way that in those platforms themselves, code is instrumentalized

a tool of political power. And so there in that chapter, as well as in a later article that is coming out in December, we look at how code and the internal rules of those platforms can be instrumentally used to punish, users, in ways that are analogous to how a rule by law system is able to, punish its citizens. And the particular sovereign of that system, just like in a rule of bylaw system, is somewhat standing above the law and is able to exercise this function without being equally subject to its own limitations. Going to the next slide, like, what the idea, what we contrast to the rule by code that we see on online platforms is the idea of the rule of code where no one is above the code. And as we argue, their ambition is that at least you are able to reach at the thin conception of the rule of law where everyone is treated equally and that there is no sovereign that somehow stands above the code and is able to make decisions about, you know, excluding some and not excluding others being treated differently than other users and stakeholders of the network. Now what's interesting as we move from the web two era of the platforms that we've discussed before to the web three era is whether we are starting to see this discussion about unregulability, illegality, again, and whether there is actually something very different here. So whether the the aspiration that in this new, era, we can see blockchain based systems, being able to instantiate the rule of code or not. Now if we look at this particular slide, we can see that in the earlier era, there was this idea of the Lex Informatica and that the rule by code could be tamed by regulation by going after, through laws and regulations, online operators like, you know, the Metas and Amazons of the world. But and and and and by doing so, being able to create both a type of domestication of some of the excesses of these platforms, but also to challenge, the fact that they use rule by code abusively. Now with, the Lexcryptographica, and now this idea of the rule of code that we introduce, we end up having this challenge that in these, distributed systems, there is no easy single actor who is able to unilaterally control this network. And so you cannot use the same techniques anymore to be able to exercise control over the network and, in a way, deal with any sort of policy shortcomings that might arise. And so to conclude this chapter, what we look at is how certain technological guarantees within on chain governance act as constitutional constraints. So if we look at the properties of blockchain systems, which are in the next slide, whether that's the fact that they're decentralized, that they're global and transnational, that they're resilient, that they're noncoercive. The the next slides have more, Pumavera, that they are tamper resistant, they're transparent, that they have a guarantee of execution, and that they're non reputable. We see these properties as being important because they act as constraints in tempering what the emergence of sovereigns. At least they try to. But as we will see in the chapter that we get to next, there are limitations in how much on chain governance is able to prevent the the rise of private interest or the exercise of sovereign power. So while the rule of code remains an important aspiration and a way of trying to replicate the rule of law within these systems, there are certain constraints that exist. And for in being able to do this through through purely on chain mechanisms. And with that, I'll hand over to to Vassal.

No. I think we can open to the we can open I mean, we welcome everyone to read more about it and explore the other chapters, but I think we can open to the discussion.

Oh, thanks. Sure. Let me see. Yeah. Just the the soft, messy people side of governance, especially online and web three patterns, social or cultural norms, pros and cons, observed, and aspire to. I guess, anything along those lines, kinda between the the more technical formal technological stuff that you've been covering. Thanks. Or or if that was too too vague, I could try to to focus in, but I think there's just a lot in there that's that I didn't hear so much about.

I'll get it started just because I'm sure we have other questions. So one thing I would say as a introductory point to the book as well is that a lot of this particular book sort of uses legal and political theory to explore these various concepts that we introduce. So whether it's trust and confidence, whether it's the, you know, rule of law, or whether it's the state of exception, That isn't to say that we aren't informed by other work that we're doing, which is, you know, you know, for involves, like, participant action research or other types of qualitative research that we are doing as Blockchain Gov. But at least within this book itself, a lot of it is much more about engaging with these particular concepts in this context and then sort of seeing almost what what are broader lessons that can be drawn from that engagement. I don't know if, Primavera or Vasil, you want to add something. I have thoughts on this based on other research we're doing, but I just wanted to mention this as a preface before saying may maybe talking about this question.

on on my side, I didn't actually fully understand the question at the end here.

May maybe one more keyword just to to flip it around to call it anti patterns, you know, again, on the on the more social and people side, if there's any any, observations or or ways to to point forward.

You mean, like, other literature to look at?

We we can move on if

you're not on the question.

Yeah. I just in the in the discussion and, you know, again, I just didn't hear so much about the the actual sort of on the ground experience with with with living beings.

Ah, okay. Okay. So Blockchain Gov. So this book is like a synthesis of a lot of the work we've done with Blockchain Gov. Blockchain Gov actually is a five years, research project. And that is one of the main pillar of the Blockchain GOF project is, digital ethnography. And it's actually engaging very, closely, with the blockchain communities on the ground in order to understand how their governance operate, in order to understand, what is the ways in which they actually want to develop and evolve their governance. And then working with, like, established scholarship and and operational empirical data in order to try and come up with, like, insights and modalities that can help communities that want to, explore and experiment with new governance structure to do so. If you're interested, we have recently released one that is like an actual report of ethnographic analysis of 12 blockchain networks, which is available on our website, and another, which is the Blockchain Governance Cookbook, which is taking those empirical insights and and further data that we collected over the years in order to come up with, like, recipes, ingredients and recipes about how we can craft specific governance structure in ways that suites specific flavors, and that is specifically towards blockchain practitioners. So this book is actually more of a very, like, open, large broad audience type of book. So it's not specifically geared towards either academic or practitioner and so forth, but it is actually the result of a lot of very on the ground, ethnographic works.

Well, I invite you to look at those two reports that are on our website because I think that might be interesting to you.

got the chat. I put them into the chat as well.

Yeah. I mean, we've we've done ethnographic research on blockchain for, like, over ten years now. So

There's a lot of data in many different outlets.

Yeah. I mean so this is, like, there is a there's specifically one chapter that is that we didn't present in this, but that was, like, legality and illegality, which kind of tackle those things, which is there's basically this this interesting interplay between blockchain technologies and regulation, where on the one hand, regulation is trying to, on the one hand accommodate, on the other hand shape and constraints specific of those applications. And on the other hand, there is the blockchain technology, which are also as a legal technology are also triggering the law to evolve and to adapt in order to cover those new domains. I think the case the most obvious case is probably the case of, like, ICOs and, and, like, the legal, the legal recognition and the legal interpretation of tokens, which which is but informed by the blockchain. Like, there is now new new technological ways of actually like, you know, exchanging assets and so forth. But then of course, those new technological ways might also bypass existing regulation, I. E. Security laws, and therefore you know, the the legal system needs to evolve and adapt to all of this. Another interesting example, and I will let Mershed develop on it, is, like, the the concept of DAOs and, to which extent can, should a DAO be recognized as a legal entity? To which extent can the blockchain system actually adopt existing corporate structure? And also, of course, you we can see how the legal system is also evolving in order to provide those new blockchain based LLC type of things. So there is really, like because the blockchain emerged, the legal system it it needs to cope with the legal system, but the legal system also needs to cope with the blockchain system. And so there's this constant back and forth between collaboration and escape, depending on what is the what is the purpose. But increasingly, as more people and especially institution wants to adopt blockchain technology and they don't do that because they wanna exist separately into their own illegal system, but because they want to interact with existing corporations, existing institutions, then there is a desire of actually collaborating and and finding ways to actually be recognized by the legal system in order to also acquire more legitimacy, but also to become an agent into the economic system.

So so I would just add to that that, you know, if in in terms that would be familiar to lawyers or maybe others as well in this space is that we're starting to see with the example of DAOs a fair bit of regulatory competition. And so there, the basis for this competition is manifold, but one of them is about whether you are trying to retrofit DAOs into existing corporate structures, which I think relates to what Nathan is saying about, you know, applying an existing regulatory logic. And there is another where legislators are interested in seeing how can we find a compromise in a way where we try to address certain important policy imperatives that are almost in some cases, you know, like, basically, bright lines that regulators will not cross? And can we do these in ways that are, quote, unquote, more DAO native? So for this latter group, which, you know, Primavera Vassal and I have called, like, regulatory equivalence and other work, we are starting to see some jurisdictions show an interest in this. So, you know, Nathan and I have talked about this before, like, with the example of Utah and New Hampshire trying to do this. But what is interesting is I think at least two things that come out from this. One is that you almost see a bargaining process with this type of, you know, regulatory competition where even with this latter group of jurisdictions that are willing to explore new ways of regulating DAOs, there is still, as I say, like this, you know, policy issues that are particularly important and that they will try to, you know, not, for example, take something that Primavera and I have worked on, like this DAO model law and implement it directly. But we'll try to make sure that those local policy imperatives are implemented into domestic legislation. So you start to see this back and forth happening, as well as, of course, trying to keep up to date with new developments in this space. And the other aspect of this that I think is interesting is that you have this dynamic where you might end up seeing not either, you know, let's say, these model approaches developed by blockchain researchers and lawyers and software developers, so people within the space as well as regulators. But through this discursive process, a third way of trying to think about how to a new, let's say, a new regulatory logic might emerge from this as well. So I think this is a sort of ongoing process that we are start we're seeing happen right before us. And I think it remains to be seen whether there there will this will become also popular within, DAO communities that have to use these frameworks if they and whether they wish to.

I I'll try to do that in a way that fits here. Sure. Thank you. I asked about it seems like this work, based on my limited understanding of blockchain technology, it's very focused on, probably mainly proof of stake these days, but the history of blockchain being proof of work and proof of stake chains to valid, techniques of validating data. So I'm just wondering if in, this research, any

of you have considered peer to peer verification systems or computing systems that don't use either proof of stake or proof of work. The example I gave is Holochain because I'm pretty familiar with the Holochain community. Holochain is still in beta, but it doesn't use either of those techniques. So I think it just has a very different profile in terms of its technical risks. So is anybody do you see any value in a purchase that he used neither proof of work or proof of stake?

On a personal level, I think it's really interesting. And, yes, I think that there's a lot of decentralized and distributed technologies and approach that have yet to be explored and that there's definitely a strong focus on blockchain, but there's a lot of things that doesn't get the same coverage. We did not address this in the book because the book is specifically on blockchain governance, but definitely super interested in this.

Cool. Thank you for sharing that, Pimatasar. I appreciate it. Yeah, I also made a comment that I'd probably like to share very briefly. I just we humans absolutely need to use governments, governance systems to do any kind of sustainably scalable coordination and collaboration of act coordination and activities and collaboration. But I do view all of these things as being artificial, which they they literally are artificial, but, but more specifically, it's all ultimately, authority that human beings, actual individuals, provisionally delegate to systems. And I think that's an important thing to consider when we look at all the many different systems that we can use to govern projects and to have territorial government such as nation state governments, etcetera, and the laws that they put into place, etcetera. We should always look at systems in a way that no matter what the rules say, the rules also need to reflect the fact that if everything basically goes to hell, human beings, need kind of backup plans for their risk management and their conflict resolution.

Plus one.

Nope. I'm plus I'm plus one. One.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you, Nathan. Thank you, everyone.

Thank you, everyone. Bye. Bye. Bye bye.

Great to be here. Thank you.